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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
EDWIN M. BORCHARDt
Pennsylvania was among the first states to enact in 1923 the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act.' Under it nearly two hundred reported cases,
embracing some of the most illuminating opinions in the country and unfor-
tunately, also some of the least defensible, have been decided in the various
courts of Pennsylvania. It is a little regrettable that the better decisions
seem to have been the earlier ones, whereas some of the later decisions mark
a retrogression.
Among the notable opinions is that of Chief Justice von Moschzisker,
speaking for a unanimous court, in Kariher's Petition.2 This was one of
the first decisions in the country on the constitutionality of the declaratory
judgment, an issue which never should or would have been seriously raised,
had it been understood what a declaratory judgment was. The court con-
cluded that from all points of view the proceeding was completely judicial
in character and laid down for the application of the statute certain guiding
principles which have been of aid in subsequent cases. The Kariher case
involved a suit by a would-be lessor of mining rights, who claimed to be
the owner in fee but whom the lessee asserted to be only a life-tenant,
for a judgment declaring that he was the owner in fee and that the chal-
lenge of his privilege to make the lease was unfounded. In granting the
declaration the court made an exhaustive study of the declaratory judg-
ment, from its English origins, and concluded that many proceedings in
Pennsylvania had theretofore eventuated in a judgment merely declaring
the rights of the parties and not requiring execution, including the case
stated to declare the marketability of title, judgments wherein wills and
written instruments are construed, and various other proceedings. The
court pointed out the necessary conditions of a justiciable controversy and
found in a legitimate proceeding for a declaratory judgment a full compli-
ance with such conditions. The court pointed out from English and Amer-
ican experience certain natural limitations on the declaratory judgment, in
the fact that the court must have jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of
the parties, that all parties in interest must be served, that hypothetical cases
will not be decided, and that the "proceeding to obtain such judgment will
not be entertained where another statutory remedy has been specially pro-
t Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University Law School.
'Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 84o, PA. STAT. ANIr. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 12, §§ 831-846.
"284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (1925).
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vided for the character of case in hand." ' The Uniform Act, containing
seventeen sections, embodies many specifications and limitations on the scope
of the remedy and affords the courts a guide in its application. The dis-
cretion given the courts by Section 6 of the Act is a judicial discretion
hardened by experience into rule and its exercise is judicially reviewable.
I. PROCEDURE
Alternative Remedy
The Kariher decision became a leading case in the United States, but
in subsequent decisions the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began to make
inroads upon it, apparently by inadvertence but yet most effectively. The
first departure from sound law lay in certain decisions which, instead of
considering the relief an alternative remedy, as made abundantly clear in
the statute itself, construed it as if it were an exclusive or an extraordinary
remedy, invocable only when no other remedy is available. 4
This error occurred (i) by attributing to the Act an exclusive purpose,
contrary to its terms, and (2) by misconstruing or misquoting the court's own
words in Kariher's Petition. The statement in List's Estate ' that the declar-
atory judgment was "provided for the purpose of having issues speedily
determined, which otherwise would be delayed, to the possible injury of those
interested, if . . . compelled to await the ordinary course of judicial pro-
ceedings," is only partly true and hence misleading; and the assumption or
warning in Cryan's Estate 6 that this was its "obvious purpose" is unwar-
ranted. Its purposes were numerous, including the following: "to afford
relief from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over
'Italics supplied. Cf. Barraclough v. Brown, [1897] A. C. 615; Bull v. Attorney-Gen-
eral, [1916] 2 A. C. 564; Nixon v. Attorney-General, [193o] i Ch. 566; Stewart, Joint Guar-
dian v. Herten, Joint Guardian, 249 N. W. 552 (Neb. 1933).
'List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 257, 129 Atl. 64, 65 (1925) (dictum, for the issue was de-
cided) ; Sterrett's Estate, 300 Pa. 116, 124, 15o AtI. 159, 162 (1930) (suit premature; dictum
that trustee's account action available) ; Williamsport v. Williamsport Water Co., 3oo Pa.
439, 150 AUt. 652 (1930) (city asked declaration as to the validity of a 192o consent judg-
ment, fixing the purchase price of defendant's utilities to be acquired by the city under statu-
tory authority. After the entry of the judgment a required election had rejected the* project,
but in 1928 state administrative officers held the acquisition necessary. Dismissed, because
declaratory judgment could not be "used to elucidate judgments". Although propriety of
action for a declaration was denied, a judgment practically determining the issue was ren-
dered) ; Nesbitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 380, 165 AtI. 403, 405
(1933) (action for construction of insurance policy, dismissed on ground that the effect of
non-waiver between insured's brother and defendant company, and whether brother was
within ambit of his authority in driving car at certain time and hence within coverage of
policy, and other questions raised "can be litigated in the established course of legal and
equitable proceedings, and therefore the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be in-
voked") ; Appeal of Kimmell, 96 Pa. Super. 488, 490 (1929) (interpleader bill by stakeholder
held proper remedy) ; Myer's Estate, io D. & C. 291 (Pa. 1928) (petition that trust has
terminated; held, ordinary procedure suffices).
r Supra note 4, at 257, 129 Atl. at 64.
63oI Pa. 386, 152 Atl. 675 (1930). See also Appeal of Kimmell, supra note 4.
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legal rights, without requiring one of the parties interested so to invade
the rights asserted by the other as to entitle him to maintain an ordinary
action therefor"; 7 to afford a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicat-
ing controversies over legal rights;s to narrow the issues, by disposing of
disputes at their initial stages, and thus to prevent the accumulation of
bitterness and impaired relations which acting upon one's own interpretation
of one's rights necessarily invites; 9 to make it unnecessary to destroy the
status quo as a condition of judicial relief, thus enabling written instruments
to be construed when the dispute first arises ;10 to enable a debtor or obligor
to assert compliance with or to disavow his debt or burden and obtain a
declaration of release, complete or partial;"- to enable a creditor or bene-
ficiary whose interests are jeopardized by attack or denial to establish his
claim and, by vindicating his rights, prevent further and future injury;12
to enable a claimant to choose a mild but adequate form of relief by declara-
tion in place of drastic and harsh coercion which he neither desires nor
needs; 13 and other purposes identified with the stabilization of contested
legal relations.
After the decision in Kariher's Petition the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court seemed to fear that the declaratory judgment might displace all other
forms of relief-an unjustified fear because most suitors need much more
than a declaration-and then sought to cut down the effect of the Kariher
decision by misconstruing or misquoting its language, to the effect that a
declaratory judgment will be denied "where another statutory remedy has
been specially provided for the case in hand," as if it had read "where
another equally serviceable remedy has been provided." For example, in
Leafgreen v. La Bar 14 the court says:
7 KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 6o, § 3132; see UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
AcT § 5; Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 524, 14o AtI. 506, 512 (928) ;
Taylor v. Haverford Township, 299 Pa. 402, 410, 149 At. 639, 641 (193o), and opinion be-
low, 18 Del. 537, 540 (Pa. 1928).
1 Brown v. Levin, 295 Pa. 530, 534, 145 AtI. 593 (1929) ("inexpensive and expeditious");
City of Chester v. Woodward, 13 D. & C. 201, 203 (Pa. 1929) ("for the speedy determina-
tion of a real controversy") ; Swank Motor Sales Co. v. Decker, 4 Cambria 28, 29 (Pa. 1932)
("in the interest of expediency and economy, ,and as a practical help in ending this contro-
versy").
"Kariher's Petition, supra note 2.
o "The main purpose of the act is to provide a convenient method of determining the dis-
puted interests of parties under 'deeds, wills, written contracts or other writings constituting
a contract'" and "rights under statutes". Senft's Petition, 15 D. & C. 792, 793 (Pa. 193o).
' Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., supra note 7 (that plaintiff's offer of build-
ing to replace burned structure was satisfactory compliance with obligation).
' Everts v. Kepler, 9 D. & C. 439 (Pa. 1927); Whiteside v. Merchants Nat. Bank,
187 N. E. 7o6 (Mass. 1933); and cases cited in Borchard, Judicial Relief for Insecurity
(I933) 33 Cor- L. Rv. 648.
1 Lawrence v. American Surety Co., 263 Mich. 586, 249 N. W. 3 (1933) ; Holly Sugar
Corp. v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac. 2o6 (93).
""In 293 Pa. 263, 264, 142 Atl. 224 (1928), the executor's account had been filed and
issue was raised on exceptions, denying propriety of certain credit. Before exception was
argued, objectors petitioned for declaratory judgment, which was denied on ground that the
issue was determinable in the pending suit. This was different from denying it on general
ground that another remedy was available.
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"In Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 445, 471, [131 Atl. 265, 271] we
said, construing the act here invoked, that a proceeding to obtain a
declaratory judgment will not be entertained where another equally
serviceable remedy has been provided for the character of case in hand."
The misquotation is obvious. A "statutory" remedy for the special
type of case submitted is merely an indication that a special jurisdiction will
not be interfered with by the declaratory judgment proceeding. An "equally
serviceable" remedy implies no special jurisdiction but an alternative remedy,
and suggests that when an alternative remedy is available the declaratory
judgment will not be entertained. In Ladner v. Siegel "' the quotation is in
fact made to read "equally available", although qualified by the word "ordi-
narily". This is a quite considerable deviation from the function of quota-
tion and of the meaning of the well-known English rule concerning special
statutory jurisdiction expressed in the Kariher case.
In Taylor v. Haverford Township :' the court, apparently unconscious
of its prior deviation, reiterates in exact quotation the sound rule announced
in the Kariher case. But in Sterrett's Estate,17' decided only a month later,
the court lurches further than ever in the following quotation:
"Moreover, from the Kariher Case down to our latest utterances
on the subject of declaratory judgments, in Taylor v. Haverford Town-
ship, 299 Pa. 402, [149 At. 639] this court has uniformly ruled that
relief may not be granted under the Act of June 18, 1923 . . . where
another established remedy is available."
This now converts the declaratory judgment into something like an
extraordinary remedy, not to be used where an ordinary remedy is available.
The words "established remedy" were repeated in Cryan's Estate,'" although
numerous declaratory judgment cases therein referred to could as easily have
been brought for different relief; and again in Nesbitt v. Manufacturers'
Casualty Ins. Co. 19 Thus, the statutory remedy for the special case, which
was the ground for refusing a declaratory judgment in the Kariher opinion,
has by mistaken evolution become the established remedy of the later cases.
This distortion should not be permitted to continue, for it is directly contrary
to the words and purposes of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, as
will presently be shown.
The fact that the courts have the power to grant a declaration "whether
or not further relief is or could be claimed," is an indication that the declara-
U 294 Pa. 368, x44 Atl. 274 (1928).
"9 Supra note 7 (where plaintiff obtained a declaratory judgment that a zoning ordinance
was invalid).
:' Supra note 4, at 124, 15o AtI. at 162.
'9Supra note 6, at 394, 152 Ati. at 678.
'9Supra note 4.
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tion may be granted, though a coercive remedy might have been but was
not sought. The fact that prayers for relief are constantly framed in com-
bination for a declaration plus an injunction, damages, specific performance,
etc., clearly shows that a declaration may be asked, although a coercive
remedy "is or could be claimed". That is, whether a coercive decree is or
is not claimed in the action shall not bar the grant of a declaratory judgment.
The declaration may therefore be asked alone or in combination with other
decrees or in the alternative. Section 8 of the Uniform Act provides:
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may
be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor
shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief.
If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable
notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated
by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief
should not be granted forthwith."
This again makes it clear that a declaration may be sought and granted,
even though further coercive relief might be or might have been possible,
and that the declaration alone might be and would be sought. Experience
has shown that when the rights are declared, the judgment being res judicata,
further relief is rarely, if ever, required or asked. But if a losing party should
have the temerity and recklessness to defy the court's declaratory judgment,
which irrevocably fixes the rights of the parties, the winning party is not
helpless but, on petition, may obtain an order carrying the judgment into
coercive execution. The fact that requests for a declaration and coercive
relief are often asked in the alternative 20 is an indication that the declaration
is not an extraordinary remedy or that there is any inconsistency between
the two or that a request for the one excludes the other. In the British
jurisdictions the courts frequently grant a declaration sua sponte when they
feel unable to grant coercive requests, a practice which has the effect of
adjudicating conclusively the substantive rights of the parties and terminat-
ing the case. Moreover, the fact that the statute enjoins on the courts a
liberal construction 21 should have dissuaded the Pennsylvania court from
its illiberal and unsound view.
Finally, another inadvertent misconstruction of the law was made in
Cryan's Estate. The court says:
". .. The provision in section i of the statute, that the courts
shall have the right to act thereunder 'whether or not further relief is
20 See e. g., Fess Oil Burners, Ltd. v. Mutual Investments, Ltd., [1932] 2 D. L. R. 16 (an
action to recover damages for conversion and wrongful detention of an oil burner or in the
alternative a declaration that plaintiff was privileged to remove it). See also Mackintosh v.
Pogose, [,895] I Ch. 505.
n "This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; and is to be
liberally construed and administered." UNIFOR DECLARATO Y JuDGmEmTs AcT § 12.
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or could be claimed,' does not mean that proceedings by declaratory
judgment are available whenever any controversy exists, but rather that
such relief may be had even though, for full relief, other and additional
legal remedies must be resorted to after the issues in the declaratory
judgment proceedings have been determined. The act as a whole shows
this to be its meaning." 22
It had never been suggested that "proceedings by declaratory judgment
are available whenever any controversy exists." Such judgment may be
denied when there is a statutory remedy provided for the special case, when
it will not terminate the controversy, when it is not expedient, when a jury
should determine facts, when all the necessary parties are not before the
court, and in numerous other cases in which courts have been sustained in
employing their discretion to deny a declaration. But although the meaning
attributed by the court in Cryan's Estate to Section i would seem to refute
the erroneous suggestion that a declaratory judgment cannot be asked when
another remedy is available, it does not mean, it is submitted, that a declara-
tion may be obtained although full relief may require a further petition to
the court under Section 8 of the Unifornt Act, but means merely that a
declaration may be asked (i) even though a coercive decree is also sought,
(2) even though a coercive decree could be but is not sought, or (3) even
though a coercive decree could not have been sought. Alternative (i) indi-
cates the possibility of a combination of prayers; alternative (2) the possi-
bility of alternative actions and prayers, a direct refutation of the Pennsyl-
vania view here criticized; and (3) the possibility of suing for a declaration
in certain cases, presently to be discussed, where no coercive relief is possible.
In the great majority of cases in which declaratory judgments have
been rendered, including those in Pennsylvania, it would have been perfectly
possible to obtain another remedy. Instead of suing for a declaration of
right to money or other property, it would have been possible to sue for
damages;28 instead of suing to establish one's interest in a gift, legacy, or
real property, it would have been possible to sue for the property or its
equivalent or for possession or ejectment ;24 instead of a taxpayer's suit for
a declaration of invalidity of public action, he could have sued for mandamus
or injunction ;25 instead of a suit for the construction of a contract or deed,
it might have been possible to sue for mandamus, injunction, specific per-
= Supra note 6, at 391, 152 Ati. at 677.
Reap, Ex'r v. Wyoming Valley Trust Co., 300 Pa. 156, 15o Atl. 465 (1930) ; Morgan
v. Wyoming County Com'rs, 12 D. & C. 165 (Pa. 1928); Blakeslee v. Wilson, i9o Cal. 479,
213 Pac. 495 (923).
Sloan v. Longcope, 288 Pa. 196, 135 Atl. 717 (1927) (landlord's right to possession of
premises, plus execution) ; Morris v. Morris, 13 D. & C. 634 (Pa. 193o).
Kl-Aauder v. Cox, 295 Pa. 323, 145 Atl. 290 (1929) (Kephart, J., remarked that there
were three remedies for official action-injunction, mandamus, and declaratory judgment).
Cf. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments in Administrative Law (933) II N. Y. U. L. Q. REv.
139.
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formance, or damages; 26 instead of a suit for the construction of a statute,
an action for a penalty or injunction, quo warranto or mandamus might have
been brought ;27 instead of a suit to establish the validity or marketability of
title to real estate, it might have been possible to sue for specific performance
or other coercive decree; 2- instead of a declaration of rights under a will, it
might have been possible to bring a statutory bill for the construction of the
will or for coercive decree; 29 instead of a declaratory suit to establish the
invalidity of a consanguineous marriage, it might have been possible to pro-
ceed under a statute.
3 0
These cases, selected at random, merely indicate that in most of the
cases alternative remedies were available and were often recognized as having
been available. But the declaration was issued because it was a proper
remedy, apparently satisfied the plaintiff, and probably was more speedy and
efficacious than the more complicated executory remedy he might have
elected. There was probably a good reason for preferring the milder to the
harsh remedy, for the declaration, in contrast with coercive relief generally,
enables the issue to be determined without destroying the status quo or the
relations between the parties. At all events, if on the facts a plaintiff is
entitled to a declaration, it is not the function of a court to force upon him
a more drastic remedy. The unfortunate result of the Pennsylvania aber-
ration is the fact that attorneys seem now unable to tell which view the court
will take in a particular case, and are hence discouraged from employing the
declaratory procedure. Perhaps it is better to be consistent, even if wrong.
The discretion to decline declaratory judgments is not the equivalent of
arbitrariness or caprice, but, as we shall see, is a well-defined policy founded
on definite principles. It is not within a court's proper legal discretion 
to
- See Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216, 223, 146 AtI. 571, 573 
(1929)
("The presence of these direct remedies [garnishment by creditor and 
suit by insured
against insurer] would not affect the right to a declaratory judgment, for reasons 
unnecessary
to state").
' Cupp Grocery Co. v. Johnstown, 288 Pa. 43, 135 Atl. 61o (1927), 
aff'g 88 Pa. Super.
6o2 (1926) ; Fox, Dist. Att'y v. Ross, 7 D. & C. 263 (Pa. 1926) (after defendant 
had filed
petition for mandamus to have district attorney elected at next election, incumbent 
appointee
to vacancy filed petition for declaration that he held for full term; cf. Wingate, 
Surrogate v.
Flynn, Sec'y of State, 139 Misc. 779, 249 N. Y. Supp. 351 (1931)) 
; Commonwealth v. Mil-
liren, io D. & C. 393 (Pa. 1927) ; In re Petition of Templar Motor Car Co., 
27 Dauph. 276
(Pa. 1924) ("either by appeal" from decision of board or by declaratory judgment).
'- Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. II, 13o AUt. 238 (1925) ; Smith's 
Petition, 291 Pa. 129,
139 Atl. 832 (1927) ; Ellis v. Commonwealth Trust Co., io D. 
& C. 144 (Pa. 1927).
B'Nai B'Rith Orphanage v. Roberts, Ex'r, 284 Pa. 26, 13o Atl. 298 
(1925) ; Dommell's
Estate, 286 Pa. 509, 134 Atl. 379 (1926) ; Brown's Estate, 289 Pa. 101, 137 At. 132 (1927);
Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930).
'a Duchi v. Duchi, ii D. & C, 61o (Pa. 1928). In Saintenoy, v. Saintenoy, 
io Wash.
123 (Pa. 1929), the court refused to rule that a declaration could not 
be brought to estab-
lish the invalidity of a bigamous marriage, for which a special proceeding under 
an 1859
statute was provided.
In the seven wills cases cited by von Moschzisker, C. J., in Cryan's 
Estate, supra note 6,
all decided under declaratory procedure, it would probably have been 
possible to resort to
another remedy, at least ,for the determination of some of the issues 
involved.
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dismiss an action for a declaratory judgment merely because another remedy
was also available.
In some cases, it is proper to refuse a declaration because another
remedy will afford better relief.3 ' It is also proper not to permit a final
judgment to be opened or questioned by collateral suit for a declaration, 32
although there is no reason why a judgment which has become a source of
rights but is unclear or ambiguous cannot be interpreted by declaratory
action."3 While coercive relief often responds more effectively to the plain-
tiff's needs than a declaration, for which reason a declaration may be refused
as insufficient, it often happens that a declaration will be regarded as equally
effective or even superior. Thus, a trustee's action to determine the interest
taken by a legatee or devisee is frequently tried by declaratory judgment in
preference to other actions. In one such case, a Pennsylvania court re-
marked:
".. . the remedy sought under this act is probably the most convenient
and satisfactory one that exists at present for determining the matter
in controversy. An action of ejectment might be a proper and con-
venient remedy, but, in the end, it would turn upon the construction of
the paper writings or the two wills to be construed by the court . . ." 34
The conflicting claims to interests in real property can often be more effec-
tively determined by suit for a declaration than by any other form of action
and courts have in such cases made special mention of the advantages of
the declaratory action. Thus, the existence or nonexistence of liens or prior-
ity among them " and the extent of interests or the validity of title taken
,' Gray v. Lee, 44 Montg. I (Pa. 1927) (for case in hand, assumpsit deemed better than
a declaratory action, for execution was needed).
' Williamsport v. Williamsport Water Co., supra note 4.
'Lloyd v. Weir, 116 Conn. 2O, 164 Atl. 386 (1933)' (invalidity of judgment avoiding
will). The Williamsport case, supra note 4, might have been deemed within this rule.
' Morris v. Morris, supra note 24, at 635.
' In Troffo v. Camione, 16 D. & C. 92 (Pa. I93O), it was claimed that defendant's asserted
lien is nonexistent. In 1928, defendant conveyed two tracts of land to LC, wife of SC, taking
in payment a judgment note payable a year from date and signed by LC and SC. This deed
was recorded. About a month later another note was substituted for the original note, this
one being payable one day after date. Ten days later, judgment was entered on this note. On
the same day, LC and SC conveyed to plaintiff in consideration of $i and payment of a 1927
judgment debt which they owed plaintiff. Plaintiff did not know of the judgment lien to de-
fendant and did not search title. Plaintiff could not sell or finance the land because of de-
,fendant's assertion of his lien against the land. Broomall, J., at 93: "If the petition asked
this court to construe an order or judgment entered in an adverse proceeding, we would feel
that it would not be a proper place for a declaratory judgment, but nothing of that kind is in-
volved. . . . This question, we think, is one that the court may with propriety be asked to
determine in a proceeding of this nature. Admittedly, the contention of the Camiones that
they hold a lien against the property in the hands of Troffo interferes with his advantageous
disposition of said property, and except by a proceeding of this sort we are not aware of any
action he could take to correct this condition. We cannot insist that the judgment against
Lucy Christopher be stricken off or satisfied, because the Camiones have undoubtedly a valid
claim against Mrs. Christopher under that judgment, which they may enforce against any of
her personal property in this county or against any real estate which may stand in her name.
The plaintiffs in the Camione judgment against the Christophers might raise their present
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
under deed, will, or statute 3' have been conveniently settled by declaration
in preference to other actions.
Jurisdiction
The Uniform Act provides that "courts of record within their respec-
tive jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights." This language was
designed to indicate that existing jurisdiction over subject-matter and parties
was not intended to be altered by the statute, but that a new procedural device
or vehicle of relief was now supplied which, by narrowing the controverted
issue, enabled traditional litigation to be determined in a more expeditious
manner, and, in some cases, by changing the strategic position of the parties
plaintiff and defendant, enabled new types of disputes to be adjudicated and
hence new legal interests to be protected. Thus, a debtor can now sue his
creditor for a judgment declaring that he is not liable; a covenantor can
sue for a declaration that he has been relieved of liability by change of cir-
cumstances. Release from an alleged duty or liability, i. e., privilege or
immunity, is now recognized as a legal interest as worthy of judicial pro-
tection as the imposition of the duty. But the courts in which the issue is
to be tried were not intended to be changed by the Act.
Relying on the rule expressed in Kariher's Petition to the effect that a
declaratory judgment will not be issued "where another statutory remedy
question either by a sheriff's sale under their judgment and a subsequent action of ejectment
or by a proceeding under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act of May 21, 1921, P. L.
1045; see South Central B. & L. Ass'n v. Milani, 3o0 Pa. 250; but the present plaintiff cannot
compel them to adopt either proceeding at this time, nor can he compel them, prior to 1933,
to issue a writ of scire facias on their judgment against the Christophers, naming him as terre
tenant, in order to determine whether their judgment continues to bind his land." Moore v.
Oyer, 21 North. 345 (Pa. 1928) (priority in mortgage liens among several claimants; ques-
tion had arisen at sheriff's sale; held, declaration in advance of sale the proper procedure).
I See Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co., 298 Pa. 182, 188, 148 Atl. 94, 96
(1929) (bill to restrain sheriff's execution on property of which plaintiff holds title, against
defendant's claim that it was conveyed in fraud of creditors; property had been mortgaged
to trust company, not party to this suit. After denying equitable jurisdiction and suggesting
necessity for suit at law by creditor, then execution on judgment, court added: ". . . We
think that, if there is a fear of this mortgage being discharged by the proposed sheriff's sale,
the status of the mortgage and the rights of the mortgagee can be determined in proceedings
under the Declaratory Judgments Act, with all parties in interest on the record . . .") ;
Orndoff v. Consumers' Fuel Co., 3o8 Pa. 165, 170, 162 Atl. 431, 432 (1932) (petition by
lessee for declaration as to amount of oil royalties due various lessors, several subleases hav-
ing been made. On the availability of the declaration, Schaffer, J., remarked: ". . . It
would be difficult to settle in ejectment all the rights and claims of the three interests in-
volved ;-impossible, it would seem, to have adjusted them in trespass, and, while they might
have been worked out in equity, that is not a more appropriate remedy than the one invoked,
in which the judge sat without a jury . . .") ; Morris v. Morris, supra note 24 (petition
by trustees to determine what interest WM took under will. Property devised on condi-
tion of occupancy, and when he ceased to occupy, heirs claimed it. Sayers, P. J., considered
declaration "most convenient and satisfactory", for ejectment, also proper, would also turn
on construction of same will) ; Johnson's Estate, 15 D. & C. 347, 348 (Pa. 193o) (petition
by grantee who had mortgaged property and whose title had been questioned for declaration
of what interest his grantor had received under will. Said the court [Kent, P. J.] : ". . . the
remedy sought under this act is probably the most convenient and satisfactory one that exists
at the present for determining the matter in controversy. Any other action would undoubt-
edly turn upon the construction of the will to be construed by the court under the submission
in this proceeding.").
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has been specially provided for the case in hand," the Orphans' Court in
Pennsylvania has been somewhat strict in refusing to go beyond the func-
tions of construing the will so as to determine questions of title to property
arising thereunder, 37 or in maintaining that the disputed rights of successors
in interest should be determined on the filing of the executor's account 38 or
specifically under the Fiduciaries Act,39 or that special proceedings under
other statutes are exclusively appropriate. 40  Certainty would hardly seem to
have been promoted by the decision in Patanyi v. First National Bank of
Pittsburgh 41 that a petition claiming ownership of money paid by but re-
turned to the bank after a wife's death, should have been brought in the
Orphans' Court, wherefore the action must be dismissed. But the suggestion
and ruling that a suit for a declaration of rights may be dismissed when there
is an adequate remedy at law 42 cannot be sustained, for the declaratory
judgment is, as already observed, not an equitable or extraordinary remedy,
but an alternative remedy. The conclusion that the same issue is pending
' Frederick's Estate, io D. & C. 591 (Pa. 1927) (plaintiff's title to realty; also dismissed
because without defendant it was an abstract question) ; Kunsman's Estate, ii D. & C. 783
(Pa. 1928) (request for declaration between parties, not as heirs, but as adverse claimants to
testamentary fund) ; Heist v. Citizens' Trust Co., 12 Leh. 333 (Pa. 1927) (attempt
to enforce by declaration a decedent's promise to let plaintiffs share in estate) ; cf.
Paine's Estate, 13 D. & C. 629 (Pa. 1930) (in which construction was sought of right to
testamentary gift of rent, in hands of third party). Gest, J., who had construed the power of
the Orphans' Court narrowly-Duff's Estate, 4 D. & C. 315 (Pa. 1924)-was inclined to hold
that declaration should be withheld because of inability to enforce it against third party, but
considered that the Supreme Court had construed the Act more broadly: B'Nai B'Rith Or-
phanage v. Roberts, Ex'r, supra note 29; Kariher's Petition, supra note 2; and Kidd's Estate,
293 Pa. 21, 141 Atl. 644 (1928), hence granted petition; In re Sedor Estate, 24 Luz.
167 (Pa. 1926) (questioned title to real estate, originally devise, where vendee ques-
tioned plaintiff vendor's interest). In Hirst's Estate, 13 D. & C. 683 (Pa. 1930), court
refused to decide amount to be set aside to protect annuity, as this was within exclusive
jurisdiction of Orphans' Court.
'Sterrett's Estate, supra note 4; Loughlin's Estate, lO3 Pa. Super. 409, 157 Atl. 494
(I93I), aff'g 14 D. & C. 67o (Pa. 1931) (no controversy; issue determinable on executor's
account) ; Follweiler's Estate, 6 D. & C. 757 (Pa. 1924) (no controversy; trustee should file
account and request audit).
I' Moore's Estate, 18 D. & C. 37 (Pa. 1932) (petition by executor to determine who takes
deceased beneficiary's share. Held, adequate remedy on filing account under Fiduciaries
Act) ; in the Estate of Washington L. Stoey, 34 Dauph. 63 (Pa. 193o) (on authority of Ster-
rett dictum, held, statutory remedy available under Fiduciaries Act) ; Sacred Heart Church
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 78 Pitts. 616 (Pa. 1930) (same) ; McKinney's Petition, 79 Pitts. 596
(Pa. 193o) (same).
I McCalmont v. McCalmont, 93 Pa. Super. 203 (1928) (Act of 1859 affords procedure
for annulment of bigamous marriage" [see also Shallenberger v. Shallenberger, 8 D. & C.
235 (Pa. 1926) ; Saintenoy v. Saintenoy, supra note 30]) ; Reading Council of Boy Scouts v.
County of Berks, 22 Berks 201 (Pa. 1929) (statutory proceeding for tax exemption deemed
proper) ; In re Petition of Atomite Corp., 29 Dauph. 113 (Pa. 1926) (appeal from adminis-
trative board proper).
4177 Pitts. 328 (Pa. 1928).
'Brewer, Treas. v. Brasted, ii D. & C. 103 (Pa. 1928) (that defendants are illegally
constituted, their contracts void, and plaintiff treasurer will be personally liable if he pays
money on them. Two grounds for dismissal were asserted: (i) that the issue was pending
in another action, a proper ground; and (2) that there was an adequate remedy at law, an
improper ground).
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in another action is a sounder ground for dismissal, 43 and it is, of course,
proper to refuse a declaration where the court concludes in its discretion that
the relief necessary to satisfy the plaintiff is not sufficiently afforded by the
declaration but can be obtained only by a coercive remedy.44  Such a ground,
however, requires strong supporting evidence and should distinctly avoid the
inference that only an equally adequate remedy is suggested. Yet the mere
pendency of another proceeding has not uniformly defeated the declaration,
for in Fox, Dist. Att'y v. Ross,4' after Ross had filed a petition for man-
damus to have a district attorney elected at the next election, Fox, the incum-
bent, who had been appointed to fill a vacancy, successfully filed a petition
for a declaration that he held for the full term. The inconsistency which it
is feared many of the Pennsylvania decisions disclose is probably due largely
to the uncertainty created by the chameleonic position of the Supreme Court
in construing the declaratory judgment at times as an alternative remedy,
as it is, and at times as an exclusive remedy, which in most cases it is not.
This has caused them on occasion to try to find whether another remedy,
under statute or otherwise, might not have been brought and, if the conclu-
sion is in the affirmative, to dismiss the petition for a declaration. As
already observed, this is only proper when the statutory remedy has been
specially provided for that special type of case and when, to depart from it,
would defeat the purpose of such statute; or when the other remedy available
is deemed more complete in responding to the plaintiff's actual needs so that
the petition for a declaration may be deemed not sufficiently conclusive or
helpful in terminating the controversy.
Justiciability
In Kariher's Petition the Supreme Court laid down a rule as to justici-
ability in actions for a declaratory judgment which has been followed and
" Dempsey's Estate, 288 Pa. 458, 137 Atl. 170 (1927) ; Leafgreen v. La Bar, supra note
14; Brewer, Treas. v. Brasted, supra note 42. The trustee's account proceeding is sometimes
a more complete remedy, supra note 39.
"This rule will explain several of the cases cited supra notes 38 and 39, e. g., Follweiler's
Estate, supra note 38 (construction of gift believed "safer" in proceeding to audit trustee's
account) ; see also Board of Trustees of Eastern State Penitentiary v. Gordon, Sec'y of Bank-
ing, 16 D. & C. 54 (Pa. 1931) (plaintiffs claimed declaration of preferred status as bank
deposit creditors. Bank had given surety bond for these deposits. Held, remedy on the bond
should be first resorted to) ; Gray v. Lee, supra note 31 (speedy remedy in assumpsit, better
than declaration, which would require supplementary procedure to secure execution, which
plaintiff really desires) ; Patanyi v. First Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh, supra note 41 (could have
been speedily decided on administration proceedings).
An affidavit of defense in a pending suit may not be used as a petition for a declaratory
judgment. Leafgreen v. La Bar, supra note 14; Rockwood & Co. v. Pusey, 95 Pa. Super.
129 (1928). However, it is quite common for a defendant in a counterclaim to ask for a
declaration of rights. Cesareo v. Cesareo, 134 Misc. 88, 234 N. Y. Supp. 44 (1929) ; Harrison
v. Duke of Rutland, [1893] i Q. B. 42. See Conn. Rules, § 64 (e), "the defendants in any ap-
propriate action may seek a declaration by a cross-complaint".
'- Supra note 27. But cf. Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 6 D. & C. 472 (Pa. 1924) (quo
warranto by defendant to try title to office given right of way over declaratory action already
brought by plaintiff).
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repeated both in Pennsylvania 46 and in other states. Chief justice von
Moschzisker there stated for the court:
"Jurisdiction will never be assumed unless the tribunal appealed to
is satisfied that an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one,
exists between parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court,
and that the declaration sought will be a practical help in ending the
controversy."
The statement is sound, for it indicates succinctly the conditions of
justiciability, an issue actually contested by adverse parties before the court
which an adjudication will terminate. The term "ripening seeds" of a con-
troversy was helpful, because it indicated not that sufficient accrued facts
may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception, before
it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and often
violence of a full-blown battle with its destructive incidents, conditions, and
consequences. It describes a state of facts indicating "imminent" and
"inevitable" litigation. In the cases of In re City of Pittsburgh's Consoli-
dated City Charter and Cryan's Estate, the court explained what it meant by
the distinction between "actual controversy" and the "ripening seeds of one":
"In the Pittsburgh Charter Case we explained that 'ripening seeds'
meant a state of facts indicating 'imminent' and 'inevitable' litigation.
. . . If differences between the parties concerned, as to their legal
rights, have reached the stage of antagonistic claims, which are being
actively pressed on one side and opposed on the other, an actual contro-
versy appears; where, however, the claims of the several parties in
interest, while not having reached that active stage, are nevertheless
present, and indicative of threatened litigation in the immediate future,
which seems unavoidable, the ripening seeds of a controversy appear." 47
Yet even this distinction may be misleading. The court could hardly
have meant that an actual controversy could be dispensed with as a condition
of adjudication in any case. What they must have meant to indicate-a
conclusion which might be more clarifying-was that there is a difference
between a state of facts where both sides have extra-judicially taken their
respective antagonistic positions and acted upon, or indicated their immediate
intention to act upon, them, and that state of facts where one of the parties,
moved by a challenge or denial or attack upon his rights or by some cloud
emanating from documents or new events or prejudicial assertions, cites the
- Lyman v. Lyman, 293 Pa. 490, 495, 143 Atl. 200 (1928) ; Reese v. Adamson, 297 Pa.
13, I5, 146 Atl. 262 (1929) ; In re City of Pittsburgh's Consolidated City Charter, 297' Pa.
502, 506, 147 Atl. 525 (1929) ; Sterrett's Estate, supra note 4, at 123, 15o Atl. at 162; Cryan's
Estate, supra note 6, at 394, 152 AtI. at 678; Huester, Tax Collector v. Lackawanna County,
308 Pa. 9, 161 Atl. 537 (1932).
'7 Supra note 6, at 395, 152 Atl. at 679 (where the court added further, "indicative of
threatened litigation in the immediate future, which seems unavoidable").
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challenger into court as defendant to remove the cloud and allay the fear or
threat to his position.48  If the defendant is adverse in interest, and so
appears, it is clear that there is an actual controversy before the court. What
the court doubtless meant further to distinguish was the actual controversy
presenting a tangible and justiciable issue and the hypothetical, moot, or aca-
demic issue. For example, when a tenant contends that he is privileged to
tear down a leased building or assign a lease, and the landlord denies the
privilege, material interests being actually at stake, the controversy is real
and actual and not hypothetical, although the building has not been touched
or the assignment executed. When two persons in interest dispute as to
their right to property, to public office, to a right of way, to a personal status,
to a lien, to a privilege to act under an existing instrument or statute, to
immunity from an adverse claim, the controversy is actual and fully matured,
although no violence or trespass has yet been committed by either party.
The mere claim of a right adverse to that of a plaintiff or the denial of the
plaintiff's right or even under circumstances the refusal to recognize or the
ignoring of plaintiff's right or the claim that the plaintiff has violated the
'Long v. Uhl, 8 D. & C. 671 (Pa. 1926) (CH left his residuary estate to his wife to
use during her life, or until remarriage, and on her death any residue to their children equally.
In payment for money owed and services rendered, the widow deeded realty to her daughter
M. She did not remarry. After her death, all the persons interested in the estate except
defendant joined in a conveyance of this realty to M. Defendant refused to join, contending
that the widow had had only a life estate).
City of Chester v. Woodward, supra note 8, at 203 (whether proposed bond issue was
within terms of statute. Said Fox, J.: "The legal relations of the parties hereto un-
der the Statute of 1927, supra, are disputed, and under the Act of 1923, suPra, any person
interested may obtain a declaration of his rights, status or other legal- relations thereunder.
A mayor who is advised by his lawfully constituted legal adviser and who, therefore, firmly
believes that the act does not apply and that it is not his duty or right to certify, stands in a
dangerous position if his adviser and he are wrong. Considerable delay may be caused in the
various steps of certification and appeal as provided in the Act of 1927, supra, and its supple-
ment, supra. Avoidance of delay is within the, spirit of the act. It is important to many
municipalities within the Commonwealth to have this controversy decided at an early date.
We do not concur in the view that the prayer is purely for an advisory opinion; it is
for more; it is, we think, for the speedy determination of a real controversy as to whether or
not these improvement bonds come under the provisions of the said Act of 1927 and its sup-
plement.").
Equitable Gas Co. v. Smith, 13 D. & C. 616, 62c (Fa. 1929) (plaintiff, transferee of
rights under an oil lease, sought declaratory judgment establishing its oil rights in cer-
tain property. Plaintiff held under a 1913 title, which had been transferred in i92o to de-
fendant, but with clause purporting to reserve in the grantor the mineral and oil rights.
"A declaration such as is sought here, defining and declaring the rights, status and
other legal relations of all the parties concerned, when properly and finally adjudicated, will
terminate the uncertainty and controversy giving rise to this proceeding. There is no action
of law to which the petitioner plaintiff can betake itself, no injunction or proceeding in equity
or other statutory proceeding affording relief, and all it possibly can do under the facts and
circumstances is to obtain a declaratory judgment in this case, abandon the lease or leasehold
upon which it has expended its money, or develop the lease at considerable more expense and
run the risk of being deprived of its property and estate in the lease or lease.hold as it may
exist at the date of the death of Imri T. Smith. There is no attempt here to reform
the deed or to construe it by any of the extraneous facts or circumstances. It is not neces-
sary to consider anything outside of the written deed and agreement of lease submitted in this
case. The admitted facts in the case are sufficient to enable the court to adjudicate this case,
and the denied facts, which are the only facts that could be submitted to the jury, are imma-
terial to this issue.").
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defendant's right may all be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to claim a judg-
ment establishing his own right. Such controversies are "ripe" for decision,
as soon as the court is convinced that the antagonism is genuine, susceptible
of adjudication, and that the court's judgment will conclusively determine
the issues involved.
But where a declaration was sought as to whether a building not yet
constructed would amount to a nuisance,49 where the declaration sought
depended upon proof of the conclusive incompetence of a person who might
later recover his competence, 50 where the plaintiff's rights depended upon
the future happening of an event which might never occur,5 1 the action was
properly dismissed as premature, not ripe and academic. The state of facts
on which a judgment was requested, was predicated on an assumed and not
actual state of facts, was contingent and not certain, and hence the contro-
versy was hardly justiciable. This is quite different from a controversy
dependent upon facts that have happened or are certain to occur, which pre-
sents an issue whose decision will determine the controversy finally, although
no destruction of the status quo or violence has yet been committed. The
parties merely stand on their respective claims of right and it is apparent to
the court that the deadlock will be broken by an adjudication.
Perhaps the principal contribution that the declaratory judgment has
made to the philosophy of procedure is to make it clear that a controversy
as to legal rights is as fully determinable before as it is after one or the other
party has acted on his own view of his rights and has perhaps irretrievably
shattered the status quo. 52  Such violence and destruction make the issue
more painful and socially undesirable, but they do not make it any more
controversial. The controversy was ripe for decision before the violence
and destruction had begun. "When adverse litigants are present in court and
there is a real controversy between them, a final decision rendered in any form
of proceeding of which the court has jurisdiction is a judgment in the proper
sense of that term, and the giving of it is a judicial function, whether or not
execution may follow thereon." 13
Unless the parties have such conflicting interests, the case is likely to be
characterized as one seeking an advisory opinion and the controversy itself
as academic,5 4 a mere difference of opinion or disagreement not involving or
"Ladner v. Siegel, supra note 15.
' Sterrett's Estate, supra note 4. Cf. Straus's Estate, 16 D. & C. 231 (Pa. 1931), aff'd
307 Pa. 454, 161 Atl. 547 (1932) (claimant's interest in property depended upon death, child-
less, of two life tenants, now beyond child-bearing age).
Lyman v. Lyman, supra note 46.
See UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 3: "A contract may be construed be-
fore or after there has been a breach thereof." So may a statute or other instrument or claim
of right.
0 Kariher's Petition, supra note 2, at 469, 131 Atl. at 270.
r Lyman v. Lyman, supra note 46 (no one disputed the claim, and right was still con-
tingent on uncertain event) ; Brumagin's Petition, 6 D, & C. 431 (Pa. 1924) (doubt as to
title of person in the chain, but no defendant cited) ; Frederick's Estate, supra note 37 (de-
visee sought construction of will, without defendant).
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affecting material legal relations 55 and hence not justiciable. Pennsylvania
discloses numerous cases dismissed for lack of the necessary interest in the
plaintiff or defendant or of the necessary conflict of interest. A plaintiff
must demonstrate a tangible personal interest in the issue, which will be
definitely affected by the judgment rendered.56 Where a plaintiff company
sought a declaration of the validity of a zoning ordinance, although it did
not own or propose buying property in the zone, the plaintiff's legal interest
was deemed inadequate for an adjudication. 57 So, where both parties joined
in a petition to determine defendant's tax liability, but plaintiff's counsel
failed to appear.58 Nor is doubt of the plaintiff as to his legal rights and
duties alone adequate.59 A defendant's interest or adverse interest has been
deemed insufficient in cases where the plaintiff challenged the validity or con-
struction of a statute, but the attorney-general or administrative officer cited
as defendant was deemed not to have shown any adverse interest or taken
any adverse position.60 The defendant must show a personal interest adverse
Nagle's Estate, 9 D. & C. 392 (Pa. 1926) (widow asked, against trustees, declaration
of status, if she elects to take against the will;' held, advisory opinion) ; Estate of Martha
Lichty, 39 Lanc. 327 (Pa. 1925) (action for declaration to determine interest taken
under will); although court decided that named devisees took life estates, it refused to
pass on interest of heirs, as "advisory" only. The result is not clear. Gray v. Lee supra
note 31, at 4 ("In construing statutes, wills or contracts, before a breach occurs, or irrepa-
rable damage is done, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act serves a useful and necessary
purpose, but it was never intended that it should or could be used by counsel to seek the ad-
vice of the court in all cases when they may be in a quandary as to how to proceed.").
'6 In re Annexation of Part of Lancaster Township to City of Lancaster, 6 D. & C. 36
(Pa. 1924) (that county commissioners, in printing ballots for election, were violating stat-
ute; plaintiff, though resident in the district, considered to have no special interest) ; Public
Defence Ass'n v. Allegheny County, 6 D. & C. 182 (Pa. 1924) (corporation not a proper
party, as the constitutionality of the statute challenged did not affect plaintiff's powers).
'Bell Telephone Co. v. Lansdowne Borough, iS Del. 307 (Pa. 1927). Cf. It re
Annexation of Part of Lancaster Township to City of Lancaster, supra note 56 (plaintiff,
resident in affected district, sought declaratory judgment construing order submitting to vote
the question of annexation, and in particular whether only those in portion annexed should
vote thereon).
' Spring Township School Board v. Reading Council, Boy Scouts of America, 22 Berks
59 (Pa. x929) (plaintiff and defendant joined in the petition stating that plaintiff was about
to tax defendant's property, defendant denying liability). In Loughlin's Estate, supra note
38, the declaration was denied because both parties sought the same judgment.
w Lyman v. Lyman, supra note 46 (plaintiff was doubtful of his rights under a will, but
there was no one who disputed his claim and an event, now uncertain, must happen before the
plaintiff's right can be deemed vested) ; cf. Straus's Estate, supra note 50 (executors seek dec-
laration of their interest in residuary estate of a third party; held, not determinable until
life estate terminates, for life tenants, although beyond child-bearing age, might have chil-
dren).
0 Follweiler's Estate, supra note 38 (cestui claims right to take whole fund, having
reached twenty-one; held, filing of brief as amicis curia, by person having an interest or
opinion adverse does not make a controversy) ; Additional Law Judge, 53d Jud. Dist., 1o D.
& C. 577 (Pa. 1927) (taxpayer sought declaration construind statute for an additional law
judge; defendants, Attorney-General and county commissioners; dismissed, because no evi-
dence that defendants adverse) ; Collingdale Borough's Petition, 18 D. & C. 684 (Pa. 1932)
(borough asks declaration that statute imposing municipal liability for torts of municipal motor
vehicles cannot constitutionally apply to vehicles of volunteer fire companies, which plaintiff
does not control, Attorney-General cited as defendant; held, defendant's interest not ad-
verse, and eventual parties in interest not before court) ; School Dist. of Union Township
v. Walton, 76 Pitts. 257 Pa. 1928) (plaintiff sought declaration fixing date on which
bond election was to be held; defendant administrative officer held to have no interest therein,
as he was charged with preparation of ballots only).
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to that of the plaintiff, so that the conflict is clear. Public officers, uncertain
as to their privileges and duties, may often secure an adjudication of their
legal position, but only where they can cite and bring in a defendant adverse
in interest.' A qualified person must appear as an opponent of the plaintiff's
claim; otherwise it lacks the necessary character of a controversy.6 2  The
Uniform Act provides that "all persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration." '3 For
failure to meet this requirement, several cases have been dismissed.64 But
it may happen occasionally that a case can be effectively decided without the
presence of some parties who ordinarily might be deemed necessary, because
In Long's Estate, 9 D. & C. 196 (Pa. 1926), city attorney asked and obtained declaration
as to who, under statute, were successors of park commissioners. Whether any defendant was
cited does not appear. If not, it was an advisory opinion. In In re City of Pittsburgh's Con-
solidated City Charter, supra note 46, three election commissioners of Allegheny County
sought by declaratory judgment to determine whether they were authorized to resubmit a
charter to the electors of Pittsburgh, who had once rejected it. The petition averred that
they had no opinion on the law, and they did not allege that they had determined to resubmit
the charter. The defendants were intervenors, an elector, and a city commission who ad-
vanced a certain contention on the law. Clearly, the election commissioners misconceived the
function of an action for a declaratory judgment and were in effect seeking merely advice.
'R eese v. Adamson, supra note 46 (suit between administrative officers under conflicting
statutes; defendant had not challenged any of plaintiff's acts; where public officers are "un-
certain and insecure with respect to their legal status and duties", they must show an actual
controversy for relief by declaratory judgment) ; see also Huester, Tax Collector v. Lacka-
wanna County, supra note 46 (plaintiff sought to determine whether defendant county or
City of Scranton should bear costs of advertising lists of delinquent taxpayers; defendant
held that city should, which plaintiff did not deny; city was not made party) ; Wagner v.
County of Somerset, 96 Pa. Super. 434 (1929).
6 Brumagin's Petition, supra note 54 (plaintiff merely asserted that there was some doubt
as to the title of M, a person in the title chain, neither M nor any one alleging the invalid-
ity of the title was joined) ; Loughlin's Estate, supra note 38 (executor sought declaration of
power to sell, trustee and prospective purchaser concurring in suit; dismissed, no opponent) ;
Alcorn's Estate, i D. & C. 462 (Pa. 1933) (trustees ask declaration of authority to retain
non-legal investments; not contested, hence dismissed) ; Huffman's Estate, ii Erie
302 (Pa. 1928) (plaintiff residuary legatee paid testator's debts from his own purse and then
asked declaration fixing his rights in certain property, testator had left property to be sold
and the proceeds used to pay his debts, plaintiff was the only heir; held, with no conflicting
claims, declaration would be futile) ; Schoudt Estate, 14 Leh. 54 (Pa. 193o) (question:
power of administrator to sell, when no opportunity to sell alleged; not contested).
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Collingdale Borough's Petition, supra note 6o (refused to declare statute unconstitu-
tional when persons who might be affected by statute imposing municipal liability in tort were
not before court); Carter v. Blakely Borough School Dist., 29 Lack. 91 (Pa. 1928)
(school directors sought declaration of their right to use a certain surplus for building gym-
nasium; denied because, inter alia, taxpayers were not properly represented). That taxpayer
representation is not always necessary, see City of Salem v. Oregon-Washington Water Serv-
ice Co., 23 P. (2d) 539 (Ore. 1933) ; Note (933) 43 YALE L. J. 340.
The following cases were dismissed because designated necessary parties were not
served: Schoen's Petition, 6 D. & C. 256 (Pa. 1924) (parties in interest must not only be
made parties, but must be notified that they have been made parties and that they should ap-
pear and defend) ; Brumagin's Petition, supra note 54 (plaintiff doubtful of his title sues to
establish title of M in the chain, but M and others not cited; denied, inter alia, because in-
terested parties not cited) ; Hoffman's Petition, 7, D. & C. 88 (Pa. 1925) (in first instance
dismissed without prejudice for lack of "necessary" parties; cured in second instance, and
declaration made, but against plaintiff) ; Moorhead Estate v. Nelson, io Erie 58 (Pa. 1928)
(petition for interpretation of will, dismissed because all beneficiaries not made parties);
Focht v. Security Trust Co., 44 Montg. 217 (Pa. 1928) (petition for immunity from building
restriction dismissed because other grantees and persons interested in case of forfeiture should
have been made parties).
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there are sufficient parties before the court; in that event, the court may
exercise its discretion favorably to the issue of the judgment.65 One of the
main reasons for refusing a declaration where all necessary parties are not
served is that the judgment rendered would not be res judicata 61 or would
not terminate the controversy.
Discretion
The Uniform Act provides that the court may refuse the declaration if
the judgment would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy. 7  At one
time it was common for courts to suggest that the declaration would be
granted only with caution, and even now courts occasionally announce such
a policy.0 " But that view finds its source in opinions rendered when the
declaration was relatively rare. With the ever-growing demonstration and
conviction of the practical utility of the declaratory judgment, the policy of
issuing declarations has changed materially. The Uniform Act expressly
enjoins a liberal construction on the courts by declaring it to be "remedial";
that its purpose is "to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity"; and
that it "is to be liberally construed and administered." "
As already observed, the discretion which the courts exercise in issuing
declaratory judgments is subject to rule and appellate review. But its exer-
cise should be guided primarily by the criterion whether or not the declara-
tion will serve a useful purpose in terminating the controversy which gave
rise to the proceeding. It is for this reason that parties must be represented
before the court, and that the necessary parties must be served, for otherwise
the controversy would not be terminated by the judgment. Its special appeal
to favor lies in the fact that it is a convenient, expeditious, and inexpensive
method of conclusively settling the issue. The courts should therefore bear
these advantages in mind 70 and should grant the declaration whenever it
'-Iite v. Clark & Snover Co., 27 Lack. 225 (Pa. 1926) (receiver distributing sur-
plus of defunct corporation serves preferred and common stockholders, but only latter rep-
resented; court declares there was no preference, and that receiver did all' he could to get
all parties into court) ; Hoffman v. McAbee, 41 Montg. 164 and 167 (Pa. I925) (plaintiff
sought immunity from building restriction, and although naming ten property owners, some
of whom had objected to his proposal to build an apartment house, he served only some of
them; on second opinion, it seems court considered those served sufficient).
'Dictum in Ladner v. Siegel, supra note 15; also, Ritter v. Leach, 97 Pa. Super. 386
(1929) (plaintiff trustees sought declaration of their right to extinguish ground rents, along
with other relief; denied because it would have to be followed by other orders to be effec-
tive).
O"UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6.
" See Duff's Estate; Paine's Estate, both supra note 37; Petition of Dunmore School
Dist., 25 Lack. 170, 38 York 8o (Pa. 1924).
' UNIFORM DEcLARATORY JUTDGmENTS AT § 12. Some state statutes, e. g., Kansas, Mich-
igan, Virginia, Hawaii, add the words, "with a view to making the courts more serviceable to
the people". Cf. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Iseley, 2o3 N. C. 811,. 167 S. E. 56 (1933)
(a "liberal contruction of the Act, to the end that its purpose may be accomplished, is mani-
festly desirable").
,0/I; re Application of School Dist. of Steelton, 31 Dauph. 75 (Pa. 1927) (two
public authorities sue each other contesting disposition of school funds, again the court sus-
pected advisory opinion, but deemed it an actual controversy partly because petition "comes
from public authorities and the question involves the disposition of public funds").
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will determine the issue conclusively and serve a pacifying function in remov-
ing clouds and uncertainty from a disputed legal relationship. A recent
Michigan decision was therefore eminently sound in granting a declaration
sua sponte, while denying the plaintiff an injunction against impairment of
his unused easement of light caused by a structure which had not yet injured
him, for he had not built to the building line.7' But the courts properly
exercise their discretion against the grant of the declaration, again because
uncertainty would not be terminated, where the plaintiff's allegations require
proof of facts not before the court, or where it is considered that there must
be a jury trial, which was not arranged for,72 where further proceeding
would be necessary to enable the plaintiff to obtain the relief he really needs
or to make the judgment effective,73 or where the court has no power to
grant relief in the premises, either because the property to be affected is
outside the jurisdiction or because the court for some other reason is unable
to enforce its judgment,74 or where in the court's opinion a declaration is
inexpedient, by reason of public policy or of the fact that the question might
be raised again in some other way,75 or because it would result in possible
injustice to third parties.
76
Facts
Owing to the terms of the Uniform Act, which gives power to deter-
mine "rights, status, or other legal relations," it is sometimes assumed that
courts have no power to declare facts. But this would be an improper infer-
ence, even though it is usually possible to convert a disputed issue of fact into
an issue of law, and thus have the fact declared incidentally. The refusal to
declare facts in a particular case is usually based on the inconvenience or
1 Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 248 N. W. 869 (1933).
7-Lockwood v. Lockwood, 98 Pa. Super. 426 (1930) (plaintiff, woman, sought declara-
tion of right to use defendant's name, on the ground that he had never secured divorce from
her, he was living with another woman; held, judgment would not terminate controversy,
because dependent on proof of facts not tried) ; Gray v. Lee, supra note 31 (rights under lease
controversy; held, case involves issues of fact requiring jury trial, which was not arranged
for) .f Brown's Estate, supra note 29 (legatees could raise the issues later, upon termination
of life estates, hence not ripe for decision) ; Ritter v. Leach, suapra note 66 (had to be fol-
lowed by other orders).
"4 But cf. Paine's Estate, supra note 37 (where court refers to fact that declarations
have been granted by the Orphans' Court in Pennsylvania, although that court was not in
position to grant affirmative relief in premises: B'Nai B'Rith Orphanage v. Roberts, Ex'r,
supra note 29; Kariher's Petition, supra note 2; Kidd's Estate, supra note 37).Brown's Estate, supra note 29 (question might be raised again by legatees, on termina-
tion of life estates) ; Achenbach's Estate, 22 North. 129 (Pa. 1929) (inexpedient because
trust active).
"'Board of Trustees of Eastern State Penitentiary v. Gordon, Sec'y of Banking, supra
note 44 (to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to preferred status as depositors in in-
solvent bank, after holding that recourse should be had to surety bond, court says that dec-
laration asked would prejudice other depositors, whose shares would be reduced) ; Huffman's
Estate, sutpra note 62 (plaintiff seeks declaration of his interest; held, declaration denied,
because record must show "that there are no parties whose interest could be affected other
than the petitioner", declaration hence useless).
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impropriety of determining complicated issues of fact by declaration, either
at all 77 or without a jury trial,8 the dismissal being therefore based not on
principle but on convenience. As the procedure is somewhat summary, the
prolonged taking of testimony is not adaptable to it. And it is, of course,
impossible to pass on such a question as whether a building not yet erected
will constitute a nuisance.79 But questions of fact have been determined on
occasion by the Pennsylvania courts, e. g., whether the conditions of a devise
have been violated,80 whether a car was delivered in damaged condition.,,
The Uniform Act provides 82 that issues of fact arising in an action for a
declaration may be tried in the same way as such issues are determined in
other civil actions.
Future Rights
It has sometimes been said that "future rights" will not be declared.
But this again is ambiguous. While the courts properly refuse to declare
rights based on the effect of remote contingencies which may never happen,
they do not hesitate to declare rights based on events certain to happen, or
solve dilemmas where the plaintiff asks the declaration of his rights under
alternative conditions imminent and susceptible of determination. Every
judgment is in effect a guide to future conduct, and where the issues relate
to a state of facts actual or certain to arise there is no reason why the court
cannot determine the issue at a point where it will avoid delay, risk, and
prejudice to one or other of the parties. Removal of clouds and uncertainty,
rendering prejudicial acts unnecessary, is one of the major functions of the
declaratory judgment. This valuable purpose was made evident in a leading
Pennsylvania case, Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co.,
8 3 which has
been cited throughout the country. In that case the plaintiff trust company
had in February, 1923, leased to defendant, who subleased to defendant
motor company, a three-story, non-fireproof building used for a garage. A
clause in the lease required the lessor, in the event of fire, to abate the rent
until the premises were completely rebuilt and placed in tenantable condition.
In May, 1923, a statute was enacted prohibiting the erection for garage pur-
poses of any building not of fireproof construction if more than two stories
high. In 1927, fire destroyed the old building. The lessor offered to con-
-,Lockwood v. Lockwood, supra note 72 (that divorce was improperly obtained, and
nature of relations between defendant and another woman).
, In re Jenkins Township Fire Truck, 25 Luz. 144 (Pa. 3928) (existenc of an emer-
gency) ; Gray v. Lee, supra note 31 (breach of lease).
"' Ladner v. Siegel, supra note 15.
81 Morris v. Morris, supra note 24 (trustee's petition to determine interest taken by de-
visee under facts, and whether conditions violated).
Swank Motor Sales Co. v. Decker, supra note 8.
= UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AcT § 9.
3 Supra note 7, at 524, i4o Atl. at 512. In Morgan v. Wyoming County Com'rs, supra
note 23, the court determined the present and future liability of the county for stenographic
services rendered to plaintiff superintendent of schools.
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struct a three-story building like the original, or a two-story, fireproof build-
ing at the lease rent. The defendant declined the former, as it would not be
permitted by law to use it for a garage, and declined the latter unless the
rent were reduced. It demanded instead a three-story, fireproof building,
which the plaintiff claimed would cost a prohibitive sum and could only be
considered on a great increase in rent. The impasse was complete. The
plaintiff thereupon brought an action for a construction of the lease and a
declaratory judgment that by its offers it had complied with its obligation
under the lease as a condition necessary to restore the duty to pay rent and
that the defendant's refusal to accept operated as a termination and forfeiture
of the lease. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in sustaining the position
of the plaintiff, said:
"In a case like the present, by proceeding according to the Declara-
tory Judgments Act, the parties avoid the necessity of first actually
erecting a building in order to be in a position to obtain a judicial con-
struction of their respective rights and liabilities. The lessor . . .can
have it judicially declared whether, under the governing rules of law,
the structure tendered meets the requirements of the situation, and if
erected, would oblige the lessee, or the subtenant, to recommence pay-
ment of the rent named in the contract of lease. Lessor can also have
a further declaration as to its rights consequent upon a refusal by
defendants to accept the kind of a building tendered; and this latter
declaration must be, as found by the court below, that the lease is at an
end and plaintiff can repossess itself of the demised premises.
"A prime purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to render
'practical help' in ending controversies such as the one now before us:
Kariher's Petition (No. I), 284 Pa. 455, 471. Had defendants, instead
of refusing the offers of plaintiff, simply taken the position that, accord-
ing to their understanding of the law applicable to the admitted facts,
the building tendered would not give them what they were entitled to
under the lease, and, on that state of affairs, asked for a declaratory
judgment, or joined with plaintiff in asking for such a judgment, their
respective rights might have been judicially declared. Then, after such
a determination of the governing principles of law as we have here
made, plaintiff could either have erected the proposed three-story build-
ing, and insisted on payment of rent for the balance of the term named
in the contract of lease, or, in place of actually building, plaintiff could
have given defendants notice that its offer to build was still open; if,
under these circumstances, defendants had persisted in their refusal,
plaintiff could have accepted such refusal as an abandonment of the
lease. In other words, had the parties seen fit, they could have had the
help of a judicial declaration of their respective rights and liabilities
before taking a definite stand amounting to an ultimatum on each side
and asking for a declaratory judgment on that state of fact."
So, there is no reason why the rights of the parties accruing under
the clauses of a lease upon the expiration of the present term, cannot be
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determined before the lease has expired,84 an adjudication which will relieve
the existing uncertainty, clarify future action, and enable the parties to steer
a course which will avoid shoals and possible wreck.
Prayers for Relief
There is and should be the greatest flexibility in prayers for relief.
Modern procedure has encouraged the freedom of amendment. Declarations
and coercive relief, as already observed, are often prayed for in the alter-
native or in combination. This has the advantage of enabling the substantive
rights to be declared, notwithstanding the fact that coercive relief has had
to be denied, a contingency which under traditional procedure would have
served to dismiss the proceeding while leaving the substantive rights unadju-
dicated. That awkward result can now be averted. Indeed, where the
coercive relief alone is asked, the court may on its own initiative grant a
declaration, although not requested, where it believes that this will conclu-
sively determine the rights of the parties. Possibly it is a little more doubt-




It may now be of interest to review briefly the issues of substantive law
which have been brought before the Pennsylvania courts by actions for a
declaratory judgment. While they do not exhaust by any means the types
of issues that have been presented and solved in the United States by that
procedure, they do serve to illustrate some of its uses.
There is no type of legal relation which cannot be determined by declar-
atory judgment, but some issues lend themselves more readily to that pro-
cedure than others. Inasmuch as the simplification and narrowing of issues,
determinative of larger disputes, is a major function of the declaratory
judgment, we find that the most common uses of the declaration are in the
adjudication of disputed issues of status, issues involving the construction
and interpretation of written instruments of all kinds, including contracts,
wills, and statutes, and disputed titles to property. Some of the cases could
have been brought under more traditional procedure, but others, particularly
where it was desired to escape peril or establish security, could hardly have
been brought in any other form. These cases attract the most attention, but
they do not necessarily indicate the major utility of the declaratory action.
" Aaron v. Woodcock, 283 Pa. 33, 128 Atl. 665 (1925) (plaintiff lessee asked 
declaration
fixing his renewal term under option clause giving "the privilege 
of, releasing" at a named
yearly rental) ; cf. Manhattan Bridge Three-Cent Line v. City of New York, 
204 App. Div.
89, x98 N. Y. Supp. 49 (1923) (plaintiff's privilege to renew franchise 
not yet expired).
I Sloan v. Longcope, supra note 24 (lessor's demand ,for declaration of 
right to posses-
sion only resulted in grant of writ of execution; held, execution 
merely incidental to real
subject of the Act and need not be recited in title).
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Status
Frequently the determination of the petitioner's status, alone placed in
issue, will determine a complex of other consequential rights. Thus, a dec-
laration that a marriage is void, that a person is a legitimate child, a husband,
wife, owner in fee, life tenant, partner, stockholder, remainderman, etc., will
establish a train of legal consequences. On several occasions an effort to
determine status by declaration has been made in Pennsylvania. Thus, in
Kariher's Petition 86 the petitioner sought a declaration that he was an owner
in fee and not a life tenant, as asserted by the defendant, a conclusion deter-
mining the plaintiff's privilege and power to enter into the lease, then in
question. In several cases the attempt to have bigamous marriages declared
void by declaration was frustrated in the lower courts, on the ground that an
1859 statute had provided a special procedure for that purpose.8 7 But in
an action to declare void a consanguineous marriage the court did not hesitate
to use the declaratory procedure, while remarking that an act of 1815 might
alternatively have been invoked.88 The petition of a borough to have it
declared a school district of the fourth class was granted in the West Leech-
burg Borough case. 9
Written Instruments
Section i of the Uniform Act confers the general power to declare
"rights, status, and other legal relations" and Section 2, the power to pass
upon the "construction or validity" of a "deed, will, written contract, or
other writings constituting a contract," or of any statute, ordinance, or fran-
chise. Section 4 empowers the court to deal with any question involving
decedents' estates or trusts, from the powers of executors, administrators,
and trustees, to the rights of heirs, legatees, beneficiaries, cestuis, and cred-
itors, including any question arising in the administration of an estate or
trust.
Contracts
It has been only since the beginning of the twentieth century, with the
expansion of commerce, that the construction of contracts has become a
common function of the declaratory judgment. Thus, the existence of a
contract or its continued existence at a particular time, a fact which may
Supra note 2.
McCalmont v. McCalmont; Shallenberger v. Shallenberger, both supra note 4o. But
in Saintenoy v. Saintenoy, supra note 30, the court refused to rule on the availability of the
declaratory judgment, notwithstanding the 1859 statute.
91 Duchi v. Duchi, supra note 30.
'West Leechburg Borough v. Allegheny Township School Directors, 300 Pa. 73, 150
At. 88 (193o) (plaintiff district had been incorporated with defendant township by judicial
decree; the required administrative consent for the erection of such district had been refused;
a tax collector had secured a declaration fixing his rights in the district but thereafter the
ruling statute had been declared unconstitutional).
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depend upon the title of either party to the subject-matter of the contract,
has been successfully challenged by declaration. In Swank Motor Sales Co.
v. Decker 90 the plaintiff had agreed to sell the defendant a Buick car, taking
a Graham-Paige as a trade-in. When the latter was turned over, defendant
refused to sign a certificate of title as required by law, setting up instead the
damaged condition of the Buick and an oral agreement modifying the con-
tract. Thereupon the plaintiff successfully sought a declaration to clear the
defendant's title to the Graham-Paige and to deny the admissibility of oral
evidence to vary the contract. In Alumnca Ass'n of the William Penn High
School for Girls v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania,
9' the plaintiff,
before incorporation, had made inquiry as to endowing a bed in the MC
Hospital to be used by members of the plaintiff association, and when not in
use by any of them, then for other patients of the hospital. Satisfied as to
the terms, the association raised in 1913 a fund of $4500. In 1916, the
MC Hospital was merged with the defendant. Under the agreement the
hospital's property was to be used as a separate fund for the Graduate School
of Medicine of the University. In 1916 and 1918 the plaintiff was notified
that a bed in a certain hospital was designated for the use of the endowment.
At the beginning of 1931 the director of the Graduate School notified the
plaintiff that the expense of maintaining the endowment was increasing and
that the defendant wished to return the $45oo and terminate it. Such a
contingency had never been provided for, whereupon the plaintiff sought a
declaration that the endowment was perpetual so long as the hospital and
its successors remained in operation and that it was not permissible to return
the fund and discontinue the service.
The validity and binding character of the contract may be tried by dec-
laration whenever the dispute arises and without the necessity of purported
breach. Its nullity may in the same way be asserted. So, the respective
rights and duties of the parties, requiring construction of the contract, have
been raised by declaration, e. g., the defendant's no-right to exclude 
the
plaintiff from drilling on defendant's land or 
the amount of royalties due.
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Release from the obligations of a contract may be claimed by declaration, 
be-
fore any overt act has been committed. Thus, in the rapid changes of 
urban
neighborhoods within a single generation the effect of restrictive 
covenants
may be extremely harsh and awkward to a covenantor who believes that the
restriction has become obsolete. Yet he would incur serious risks 
of for-
feiture and much besides if he acted on the assumption that it had 
become
" Supra note 8.
UI5 D. & C. 769 (Pa. Ig3i), aff'd 3o6 Pa. 283, 159 Atl- 449 (1932). In Trustees'
Petition, 12 D. & C. 538 (Pa. 1929), trustees and eventuali beneficiary 
successfully sought
declaration that original trust had terminated. Cf. Snavely's Estate, 
4 D. & C. 405 (Pa.
1923) (termination of trust under will).
Equitable Gas Co. v. Smith, supra note 48; Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson Mfg. Co., 4 D.
& C. 387 (Pa. 1924) (on what basis, machines or 
parts, royalties should be paid).
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obsolete and then proceeded to violate it. It has therefore become common
for covenantors who claim the privilege of building structures of a type
different from that required by a restrictive covenant to seek a declaration
of their privilege so to do or a declaration that the proposed structure chal-
lenged by the defendant conforms to the restrictions of the covenant or that
the covenant was personal only and did not run with the land. Pennsylvania
discloses some interesting cases of this type.
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The legal effect of the contract or of a statute or new event, such as fire
or war, on an existing contract has frequently been raised by declaration.
The case of Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co.,94 already mentioned,
is a striking example of judicial aid in the solution of a dilemma created by
a new event, not contemplated by the parties, but which may decisively affect
their legal relations. Doubts as to which of two contractors bears the loss
entailed by fire have been determined conveniently in this form of action.95
Judgment and other creditors have had occasion to sue for a declaration
of the nullity of a conveyance by their debtor deemed in fraud or derogation
of their rights, an action which may be brought against the debtor himself or
his transferee or both. Whether the creditor's claim has been reduced to
judgment or is in process of suit or is liable to be impaired by an alleged
Garvin & Co. v. Lancaster County, 290 Pa. 448, 139 Atl. 154 (1927) (plaintiff land-
owner desiring to build four-' and six-story buildings asked declaration construing an 1852
deed and its provisions for easements of light and air; defendant contended that plaintiff's
proposed buildings violated these provisions) ; Brown v. Levin, supra note 8 (plaintiff owner
of corner lot asked declaration fixing the building line on the side street, contending that the
restriction did not apply there) ; Henry v. Eves, 3o6 Pa. 250, 159 Atl. 857 (1932) (restriction
as to type of building and area to be built upon; plaintiff sought and obtained declaration of
privilege of building certain structures and of covering entire lot) ; I, re Plastic Club, 7 D.
& C. 50 (Pa. 1925) (plaintiff landowner desiring to erect an art gallery asked declaration
fixing its right to do so under a restriction made in 1825) ; Hoffman's Petition, supra note 64
(plaintiff landowner asked declaration fixing his right to build apartment houses in view of
existing restrictions) ; Barmach v. Barwick, 8 D. & C. 479 (Pa. 1926) (where plaintiff re-
lieved his own doubts and the fears of a title guaranty company and the refusal of defendant
purchaser to take title without such guaranty, by declaratory judgment that a covenant of
1814 deed restricting building to three-story brick was personal only and did not run with
land) ; Hoffman v. McAbee, supra note 65 (plaintiff landowner asked declaration of his right
to build apartments under a restriction in favor of "private residences") ; Focht v. Security
Trust Co., supra note 64 (plaintiff claimed to have secured a release; dismissed ,for want of
proper parties).
Issue may arise because of an impending sale of the property. O'Neil v. Lex, 9 D. & C.
149 (Pa. 1927) (plaintiff had contracted to purchase property, when he was notified of re-
striction as to types of houses; the houses which he wished to build violated this restriction;
neither he nor his prospective tranferee had had notice of the restriction).
9' Supra note 7.
Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader, Att'y Gen. v. Nelson-Pedley Constr. Co., 303 Pa. 174,
154 Atl. 383 (1931) (plaintiff asked declaration fixing person to bear loss caused by the de-
struction of a partially constructed building; defendants were the contractor and surety) ;
Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader, Att'y Gen. v. Evans, 304 Pa. 445, 156 Atl. 139 (1931)
(same). See also Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. American Surety Co. of New
York, 169 Atl. 226 (Pa. 1933) (plaintiff surety of P bank asked declaration fixing surety
bound to pay balance due state on deposits; defendant was surety of A bank, which had
merged with P bank in 1931; issue: co-suretyship).
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fraudulent conveyance 96 makes but little difference. Creditors also have
occasion to seek to establish by declaration the priority of their claim to that
of others. So, bank depositors and judgment creditors have sought to estab-
lish a preferred status in the distribution of a debtor's estate.17
Leases
Some of the most interesting examples of the utility of declaratory
actions have arisen under leases. The celebrated Kariher case 98 involved a
proceeding by a prospective lessor, whose title had been challenged, for a
declaration of his title and of his privilege to make the lease proposed. The
power of school trustees to rent, instead of erecting a school building, has
thus been determined. 9 So has the validity or invalidity of leases, as well
as the identity among several defendants of the lessor entitled to particular
rents; and while this is undoubtedly equivalent to a bill of interpleader, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Kimmell's case 100 is believed to have been
in error in dismissing a suit for a declaration because interpleader was
possible.
The construction and interpretation of leases, and the respective rights
and duties of the parties thereunder, have frequently been determined by
declaration. Thus, the term of the lease or of a renewal period, whether for
a stated term or from year to year,' 01 has thus been tested. The amount of
rent or royalties due has been successfully adjudicated by this procedure.
In the case of Orndoff v. Consumers' Fuel Co.10 2 the plaintiff sought a
declaration fixing the amount of royalties due the lessors. When plaintiff
secured the original lease, he was informed by the lessors that their father
In Stalwart Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Monahan, 1O4 Pa. Super. 498, 159 Atl. 189 (1932),
plaintiff mortgagee sought to have a conveyance declared void as fraudulent. Defendant
had conveyed the property and the security to AB, subject to plaintiff's lien and a bond from
AB for prompt payment. When AB could not meet payment to defendant, property was
deeded back to defendant. AB defaulted two months later on debt to plaintiff.
07 Board of Trustees of Eastern State Penitentiary v. Gordon, Sec'y of Banking, supra
note 44 (dismissed on ground that remedy on bond should first be exhausted by plaintiff bank
depositors in defunct bank) ; English v. First Nat. Bank of Lock Haven, 9 D. & C. 718 (Pa.
1926) (plaintiff judgment creditor who had, started suit before, but did not obtain judgment
until after debtor had been adjudged lunatic, sought declaration against other creditors and
lunatic's guardian that plaintiff is entitled to priority against estate of lunatic).
" Supra note 2.
w In Mansfield Boro. School Dist. v. Mansfield High School Ass'n, 9 D. & C. 113 (Pa.
1926), contract had been made, but members of district, intervenors, attacked its legality.
Defendant association in answer claimed it was legal. Declaration refused, without prejudice
to renewal when one term changed.
In Appeal of Kimmell, supra note 4, plaintiff lessees sought declaration fixing person
to whom rent was due. In 1914, S leased oil rights in certain tract to plaintiff's transferor. In
1919, S sold to defendant a portion of this tract. Plaintiff's wells were not on this tract, but
in 1926, defendant claimed a portion of the gas rental due under the lease. S, when made
defendant, alleged that plaintiffs and defendant had complete remedy in interpleader.
x Aaron v. Woodcock, supra note 84 (whether the privilege of renewal was for a term
of ten years or from year to year).
'-' Supra note 36, at 170, 162 Atl. at 432. Also Hutchinson v. Hutchinson Mfg. Co.,
supra note 92.
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held a life estate in the property and that he would have to grant the right
of entry. Without developing the property, plaintiff assigned the lease to
C Company, reserving additional royalties for himself. The following year
he bought the interests of four of the five lessors. Four years later the
father of the lessors and the remaining lessor joined in an oil lease to N
Company. No drilling was done in this period. Three years after that
defendant acquired the interests held by C Company and N Company and
began drillings which proved to be profitable.
Schaffer, J., for the court remarked:
". .. It would be difficult to settle in ejectment all the rights and
claims of the three interests involved; impossible, it would seem, to have
adjusted them in trespass, and, while they might have been worked out
in equity, that is not a more appropriate remedy than the one invoked,
in which the judge sat without a jury under the Act of April 22, 1874,
P. L. 1o9."
One of the commonest forms of declaratory action, although it has not
apparently arisen in Pennsylvania, is the proceeding by a lessee, under a
covenant not to assign without the consent of the lessor which may not be
unreasonably withheld, for a declaration that he is privileged to assign, not-
withstanding the covenant or because under the covenant the landlord does
unreasonably withhold consent. The issue of reasonableness of the refusal
is determined before rather than after the assignment has been consummated,
with all the risks involved, thus avoiding the necessity of acting on the
lessee's conjecture as to his rights. By declaratory action the doubt and
dilemma are resolved before the risk of error has been incurred. Other
covenants have also been successfully considered in this way before fatal
mistake has been made. Thus, in Equitable Gas Co. v. Smith,10 3 a lessee,
frustrated by the lessor's successor in the exercise of his claimed privilege to
drill oil wells, a privilege which was to be forfeited for failure to complete
the well within a certain time, successfully sought a declaration of his privi-
lege under the lease. In the important case of Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay
Motor Co.,104 the lessor, whose three-story wooden building had been de-
stroyed by fire after a statute had prevented the erection of such buildings
for garage purposes, offered to rebuild under the covenant the same type of
building, which, however, could not be used for the garage desired by the
lessee, or else a two-story fireproof building, which the lessee refused except
at a reduction in rent. With the impasse thus complete, the lessor brought
an action for a declaration that by the offer it had made it had complied with
its obligations under the lease as a condition necessary to restore the duty
to pay rent and that defendant's refusal constituted forfeiture. As already
"o Supra note 48.
11 Supra note 7.
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observed, the supreme court strongly commended the utility of the declara-
tory action in solving this dilemma.'0 5 So, the lessee's privileges under the
lease, such as the claimed privilege to demolish the building and erect another,
may be determined before commencing to demolish with its attendant risks
of waste and forfeiture.10
6
The distribution of tax and other burdens as between lessor and lessee
has occasionally been put to issue by a declaratory action, which permits the
controversy to be determined without any purported breach of the lease and
during its existence. It is not always easy to determine who under the cove-
nant is to bear the increased burden of new taxes, especially where the terms
of the lease are inadequate or ambiguous. The plaintiff, lessor or lessee, as
the case may be, therefore finds it convenient to ask that the burden be borne
by the defendant, or shared or apportioned, as not falling within the limits
of the plaintiff's contractual obligation107 The right as between the lessor
and lessee to the proceeds of insurance received after destruction of the
building by fire and upon exercise of the option to purchase was brought to
trial in the interesting case of Schnee v. Elston. ° s
Not infrequently the lessee, learning that the lessor had leased or was
about to lease or sell the premises to some third party, to take 6ffect at the
expiration of the present lease, or having been notified that the lessor con-
siders the lease terminated, or having reason to doubt whether his option or
privilege to renew was still in force, petitions for a declaratory judgment of
his right to renew or to renew on certain conditions, as, e. g., for a certain
term of renewal.' 0 9 Such a proceeding, during the life of the present lease,
has manifest advantages in quieting the rights of the parties, present and
future. A lessor has successfully sought to establish the date of termination
of a period extending the lease, whether notice at a certain date by lessee to
lessor was necessary to secure the extension or whether such notice was op-
1 .Supra p. 336.
1OWashington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (193o).
11' Thornbury v. Forbes, 7 D. & C. 184 (Pa. i925) (plaintiff, surface-owner lessor who
had leased oil rights to defendant, sought declaration fixing the nature of defendant's inter-
est and defendant's duty to pay half t he taxes assessed on the property). In Cronin v.
Dougherty, ioo Pa. Super. 463 (193i), plaintiff sought declaration of defendant's non-con-
tractual duty to bear costs of rebuilding party wall, as ordered by city officers, after defend-
ant had torn down his own house.
U'S 299 Pa. io, 149 Atl. iog (i93o). Plaintiff held under a lease containing an option to
buy and requiring plaintiff to insure for defendant's benefit. In case of fire, the lease re-
quired plaintiff to rebuild or repair, with reimbursement to the extent of the insurance money
collected. After a fire, defendant collected insurance, refused to submit plans, and enjoined
the erection of any building without his approval. In the course of that suit the type of
building was fixed. Thereafter plaintiff exercised his option and demanded a credit on the
purchase price of the amount of insurance money collected.
19 Aaron v. Woodcock, supra note 84. In Dattolo v. Stevenson & Ida, 93 Pa. Super. 588
(1928), the plaintiff lessee claimed declaration that his option to renew was not vitiated by
defendant lessor's sale of the property.
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tional with the defendant.'1 0 As will have been observed, it is safer to claim
a declaration that a lease has been terminated by the lessee's breach, than for
the lessor to act on the assumption that forfeiture has taken place and to take
steps accordingly.
Mortgages
Even before there has been a default, mortgagees have a serious interest
in establishing their exact security in relation to other creditors or a disputing
mortgagor. The motive for prompt assertion of priority may be a prospec-
tive sale or default or other transaction arousing an interest in security.
Occasionally the holder of an earlier unrecorded mortgage seeks a declaration
of priority over a subsequent mortgage first registered. The priority of
mortgagees among themselves either before a sheriff's sale or on discovery
of an unrecorded obligation or attempted creation of new rights in others
has been the subject of declaratory litigation."'
Successors in interest, judgment creditors, or others may sue the mort-
gagee, and sometimes the mortgagor, for a declaration of priority of their
respective claims or of the nullity of the mortgage, even after foreclosure.
In the case of Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co.," 2 the pur-
chaser of property brought an action against the mortgagee for a declaration
that the property was free from a claimed mortgage and that it was not sold
in fraud of creditors. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the
defendant from enforcing judgment on the plaintiff's property, on the ground
that the issue was under trial on the law side. The property was sold to
plaintiff by the B Company, and the plaintiff had placed a mortgage on it to
protect the B Company's bondholders. B Company was debtor of the de-
fendant, who claimed that the conveyance to plaintiff had been in fraud of
creditors. Said the court: "The status of the mortgage and the rights of
the mortgagees can be determined in proceedings under the Declaratory
Judgments Act, with all parties in interest on record."
A mortgagor has successfully claimed a declaration of his right to have
the proceeds of the sale or the property applied in a certain way."
3
'Spector v. Bonwit Teller & Co., io D. & C. 101 (Pa. 1928) (defendant's lease expired
in January but it was agreed that it could be extended two months if defendant's new build-
ing was not ready on time, provided defendant notified plaintiff. Plaintiff contended that re-
newal was dependent on notice under a described scheme; defendant, that it was at their
option).
m In Moore v. Oyer, supra note 35, plaintiff real estate agent has sold property for BK
and had received a second mortgage which was to be used for paying BK's debts, any surplus
going to BK. BK received a third mortgage. All mortgages were recorded. Later BK
bought property through plaintiff from B and assigned his mortgage as part payment. When
BK did not pay off plaintiff's mortgage and judgment against defendant, the purchaser in
BK's sale, B stopped payment, as he had thought he was getting a second mortgage.
"Supra note 36.
IVictory Realty Co. v. Cosmos Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 15 D. & C. 304 (Pa. 1931).
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Insurance Policies
Declaratory actions on insurance policies have afforded some of the most
striking examples of this procedure. The fact that insurance is a contract
which looks to future benefits, that it is a highly fiduciary relationship requir-
ing the utmost good faith, and that it often embraces several or a series of
collateral relationships involving those causing the loss and, in the case of
indemnity or surety contracts, the position of the principal debtor, makes
these contracts peculiarly susceptible to effective adjudication by declaration.
This is due to the facts (i) that many questions of the validity of the policy
are likely to arise before the loss occurs and it is important that claims and
defenses be promptly adjudicated, and (2) because insurance companies
operating under public supervision are usually responsible concerns against
whom a declaration of liability is equivalent to a judgment for damages.
Insurance companies themselves have frequent occasion to move as actors to
disavow a policy or liability before loss, on the ground that they have been
imposed upon, or to determine the validity or form of a contract challenged
by public authority.
After a loss occurs a plaintiff may find in a declaration of the com-
pany's duty to pay the policy an adequate protection of his rights as an alter-
native to a coercive remedy. The issue may arise after the company has
indicated some defense to the policy and the plaintiff seeks a declaration that
the alleged defense is unsustainable or that it has been waived. Such actions
were involved in the interesting Pennsylvania cases of Malley v. American
Indemnity Co. and Nesbitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co.".4 Disputes
between the unpaid vendor and the vendee,"1 5 or between the protected mort-
gagee, the owner and the company as to the superior right to the insurance
fund or its proper expenditure for repairs, restoration, or otherwise, have
been promptly settled by declaration.
Statutes and Ordinances
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the construction of statutes
and ordinances has been the subject of declaratory action. This was espe-
3 In Malley v. American Indemnity Co., supra note 26, plaintiff sought declarations estab-
lishing defendant's adoption of a course of action. Plaintiff had an automobile liability policy
with defendant. After defending suit against plaintiff in trial court, in which judgment was
rendered against plaintiff, defendant refused to continue defense, alleging that plaintiff had
breached warranty as to ownership. While plaintiff had not paid judgment, he had suffered
some loss and an impairment of credit. Sadler, J., at 223, 146 Atl. at 573: ". . . Therefore,
following the above line of decisions, under a policy such as we have before us, we hold that
there is a potential loss, though money may not have been actually paid; the insured may sue
the company directly after judgment and before he pays anything, or his creditor may insti-
tute garnishment against the company. The presence of these direct remedies would not
affect the right to a declaratory judgment, for reasons unnecessary to state." Nesbitt v.
Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., supra note 4 (believed to have been erroneously dismissed
on ground that other remedy was available). See also Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
v. American Surety Co. of New York, supra note 95.
n" Schnee v. Elston, supra note lo8.
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cially provided for in Lord Turner's Act of 1850, which established the
declaratory action in the narrow form of the case stated.-"6 In the United
States, where the constitutionality or validity of statutes and ordinances can
be judicially challenged, it is the regular practice to employ this procedure
to attack or maintain constitutionality or validity, or obtain the construction
or interpretation of statutes and municipal ordinances. Section 2 of the
Uniform Act specifically authorizes any person affected by "a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise" to have determined "any ques-
tion of construction or validity" thereunder, and Section ii provides that
if unconstitutionality is alleged the attorney-general of the state shall be
served and be entitled to be heard. In the twentieth century with its kaleido-
scopic changes and the resulting necessity of ever new legislation affecting
legal relations, there has been a special need for a speedy determination of
the validity and meaning of legislation in its application to individuals. With
the declaratory judgment available there is no longer any necessity to abuse
the equitable injunction in order to bring the issue to determination."'T
Pennsylvania affords a number of instances in which the constitution-
ality or validity of statutes and ordinances has been challenged. As in all
other cases, the conditions of justiciability are demanded, and as already
observed, several cases of this type have been dismissed because of a want of
necessary legal interest in the plaintiff or defendant,"" because parties were
not adverse in interest, 91 because facts were not sufficiently ripe for judicial
decision, in which event the judgment would have been merely an advisory
opinion or have been moot,1 20 because in the court's view there was an
absence of certain parties deemed necessary to the suit,1 2 1 or because the
court's judgment would not have finally settled the issue.122  The constitu-
tionality and validity or enforceability of statutes and ordinances have been
attacked on formal and on substantive grounds. On formal grounds they
have been attacked because the heading was not descriptive of the body, as
demanded by constitutional requirements, 23 or for other procedural reasons.
The validity of election laws has been attacked by prospective electors osten-
sibly barred from vote or by those interested in defeating the results of an
' 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, §,I (1850).
u7 Cf. Note (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 1195, 12oo; Borchard, The Constitutionality of Dec-
laratory Judgments (193) 31 CoL. L. REv. 561, 589.
-8 In re Annexation of Part of Lancaster Township to City of Lancaster, supra note 56;
Bell Telephone Co. v. Lansdowne Borough, supra note 57.
' Reese v. Adamson, supra note 46 (plaintiff directors of the poor asked declaration con-
struing two statutes which they alleged were conflicting; defendants, other administrative
officers, denied that there was any controversy as to these statutes) ; Wagner v. County of
Somerset, supra note 61; Public Defence Ass'n v. Allegheny County, supra, note 56.
'2 Ladner v. Siegel, supra note 15.
Additional Law Judge, 53d Jud. Dist., supra note 6o.
Ibid.
Moore v. Lewis, IO D. & C. 466 (Pa. 1928). See infra note 13o.
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election. 124  Burdens imposed under the police power and restricting the
plaintiff's freedom in business or otherwise have been commonly challenged
by declaration. Thus, in Pennsylvania, the validity of a statute requiring
the owners of drug stores to be licensed pharmacists was so challenged, 12 5
whereas in the federal courts the more or less fictitious injunction had to be
invoked as a vehicle of relief. 26 The validity of restrictions on the use of
land or on the erection of buildings to those of certain type, 12 T especially
through zoning ordinances,: 28 has been tested in this way. The validity of
statutes and ordinances imposing taxes is commonly challenged by declara-
tion. In the leading case on the declaratory judgment in the United States
Supreme Court,129 the validity of a tax was thus challenged in Tennessee,
where it is not possible to enjoin the collection of a tax and where the state
unsuccessfully maintained that the only way to challenge it is by paying the
tax and suing for its recovery. Occasionally a taxpayer may find his immu-
nity in the constitutionality, rather than unconstitutionality, of a statute,
asserted by tax officials, and may then bring an action against the officers to
have the statute declared constitutional.' 30
The construction or interpretation of statutes is frequently demanded
by the individual affected. The plaintiff, threatened with criminal penalty,
money payments, losses, or other risk of undesirable consequences, may
demand construction in order to establish his privilege or freedom from the
threatened sanction. Thus, plaintiffs have sought declarations of their privi-
lege to conduct their business free from the supposed restrictions of a statute
or that the statute did not make unlawful what they were undertaking to do;
or that they were entitled to receive a license or permit or that their business
required none.
1 3 '
The disputed duty or power of a governmental body or official is often
determinable by a correct construction or interpretation of the governing
statute. Thus, the duties of governmental boards to require certain condi-
't Brookville's Election, s D. & C. 54 (Pa. 1924) (validity of statute validating election).
Evans v. Baldridge, 294 Pa. 142, 144 AtI. 97 (1928) ; cf. Pratter v. Lascoff, 140 Misc.
211, 249 N. Y. Supp. 211 (1931).
" Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57 (1928).
' Commonwealth Title & Trust Co. v. Yeadon Borough, 19 Del. 232 (Pa. 1928) (ordi-
nance requiring light and air on three complete sides).
' In Taylor v. Haverford Township, supra note 7, plaintiff owner challenged validity of
zoning ordinance which made his property residential. He had sold most of his holding and
retained this one piece which adjoined a business section and faced a main street. As busi-
ness property, its value was four times greater than as residential, and use was not incom-
patible with safety.
"'Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345
(1933).
'c Moore v. Lewis, supra note 123 (plaintiff owner of horses and cattle asserted constitu-
tionality of statute which exempted his animals from taxation; administrative officers had
taxed, claiming statute invalid, for defectiveness of heading).
, In re Petition of Templar Motor Car Co., supra note 27 (license for exchanging stock
had been held necessary by Securities Bureau and been refused; lack of jurisdiction claimed;
held, plaintiff could appeal from administrative decision or use declaratory judgment).
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tions for the grant of professional licenses 132 may be challenged by those
having a material interest in the proper administration of the function. The
necessity of exact compliance with statutes authorizing the issue of bonds
makes it often a matter of legal interest to the issuing authorities, to tax-
payers, and to purchasers that an ambiguous or unclear statute be promptly
construed. Thus, in City of Chester v. Woodward 133 the city raised the
question whether the issue of improvement bonds based on special assessments
was "incurring" or "increasing" indebtedness, within the terms of a statute
requiring in such event the approval of certain administrative officers. The
plaintiff may be the public authority or an interested citizen. Thus, in
Brookville's Election 131 the plaintiff administrative officers asked a declara-
tion of the validity of an election increasing the borough debt, claiming that
it had been validated by subsequent statute. So, public authorities have
raised the question of their power to levy taxes under certain circum-
stances,' 35 to collect and spend money and distribute the burden of certain ex-
penditures, 1 36 to use bond money to pay teachers' salaries,' 37 to spend money
for a county comptroller's audit,'38 to continue to occupy public office, the
issue involving the length of the plaintiff's statutory term, placed in doubt
by conflicting statutes or adverse claims,' 39 to accept, as a state sheriff,
appointment as a federal prohibition officer, under the Pennsylvania con-
stitution forbidding dual offices.' 4 °
Administrative Powers and Disabilities
Ancillary to the interpretation of statutes is the power of administrative
officials and bodies to regulate the affairs of individuals, a matter generally
dependent on statute. But administrative officials and private individuals
dealing with them also have occasion to question their powers and duties
when statutory authority may be admitted. Administrative officials have
occasion to want the protection of a declaratory judgment of their challenged
'n Lackawanna County Undertakers' Ass'n v. State Board of Undertakers, ii D. & C.
503 (Pa. 1928) (association claimed that licenses to new applicants could be issued only when
the practical experience required by a statute was "continuous" and exclusive of other employ-
ment; held, for defendants).
' Supra note 8.
'Supra note 124.
I- re Jenkins Township Fire Truck, supra note 78 (plaintiffs sought declaration of
right to impose special levy to secure funds to repair fire truck, on, ground of emergency;
denied, for defect of parties).
'mWinton Borough's Petition, 16 Del. 539 (Pa. 1924) (plaintiff sought declara-
tion as to method of apportioning costs of paving streets, in view of conflicting provisions of
1917 and 1918 statutes).
- Petition of Dunmore School Dist., supra note 68.
Woodside Petition, 77 Pitts. 8 (Pa. 1928).
Fox, Dist. Att'y v. Ross, supra note 27.
Sterrett's Petition, 9 D. & C. 430 (Paj 1926). It is doubtful who contested the peti-
tion. If there was no contestant, no declaration should have been issued, for it was then only
an advisory opinion.
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power to regulate, arrest, demolish property, levy execution, and undertake
acts bound to cause loss or damage, if they would escape the painful conse-
quences of mistake. To them such a proceeding is indispensable. Thus, in
Huber, Tax Collector v. Weakland,'4' a tax collector whose right to levy a
school tax and arrest a delinquent taxpayer had been challenged on the
ground that the tax was illegal, sought, before making the arrest, a declara-
tion that the tax, the levy, and the proposed arrest were legal and that the
defendant was subject to them. In another Pennsylvania case a sheriff
sought a declaration as to whether he was privileged to levy execution,
demanded by a judgment creditor.142 The power to enter into contracts or
carry on enterprises of various kinds has thus been put to the test.' 48
Those asking the performance of duties by public officials or the state
generally require no coercive relief. While occasionally an officer may prove
recalcitrant and require arrest, as a rule all that is needed to hold an admin-
istrative officer to his duty is a judicial decision. A declaratory judgment
therefore performs the function of mandamus, injunction, and other extraor-
dinary remedies frequently invoked against public officers. Thus, in Penn-
sylvania, councilmen, as claimants against the city, have used the declaration
to obtain an adjudication of their proper salaries, against a controller who
contended that salaries were fixed by a 1923, and not a 1925, ordinance.'
4 4
Occasionally the declaration performs the valuable function of putting in
issue the contested right and, by securing a decision, enables the petitioner
to determine which of two alternative courses of conduct he should pursue,
suspending the necessity of possibly a fatal choice until adjudication has
removed the dilemma. Thus, Judge Criswell, having been retired on a statu-
tory pension under an agreement with the auditor-general that he was to
hold himself in readiness to perform certain judicial duties until his death,
desired to enter practice without forfeiting his pension, a consequence which
the auditor threatened. The judge therefore sought a declaration that by
entering practice he retained his status as a retired judge as well as his pen-
sion or, in the alternative, that it was suspended only during actual practice,
as the court in fact decided. 145  The light was turned on first, and the leap
in the dark made unnecessary.
The duties of public officials may be declared at the instance of private
individuals or other public officials or of the particular official himself.
140
m 7 D. & C. 496 (Pa. 1925).14 Aronowitz v. Industrial Utilities Corp., 5 D. & C. 633 (Pa. 1925).
14 Mansfield Boro School Dist. v. Mansfield High School Ass'n, supra note 99 (that
plaintiffs were privileged to rent a school building for forty years) ; Long's Estate, supra
note 6o (which officers, in view of statutory change, were entitled to administer land devised
to city for a public park).
1' Easton Councilmen's Salaries, 8 D. & C. 752 (Pa. 1926). See also Morgan v. Wyo-
ming County Com'rs, supra note 23 (that county is under duty to pay for services of stenog-
rapher to plaintiff superintendent of schools).
Criswell v. Martin, 8 D. & C. 425 (Pa. 1926).
14 School Dist. of Union Township v. Walton, supra note 6o (duty of defendants to place
on ballot question of increasing indebtedness, refused for plaintiff's alleged lack of authority).
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Thus, election officials have sought a declaration of their duty to resubmit
for voting a plan of municipal consolidation.
1 47
Immunity from taxation may depend not merely on statute, but on
administrative judgment, which may be effectively challenged by declaration.
Thus, the claim that the plaintiff's lot and building were used in good faith
for the plaintiff's business and were hence tax-exempt,' 48 and that the
plaintiff was subject only to a limited tax as tendered and not to the amount
assessed 14' have been so adjudicated.
Wills
In spite of the rulings of its courts in certain cases,' 50 Pennsylvania
discloses many cases in which the declaration has been used to decide dis-
putes arising under a will. One of the chief problems, for whose solution
the declaration is peculiarly adapted as recognized by the Pennsylvania
courts, is the definition of the interest in realty taken under a testamentary
gift. This may become important in view of a pending lease, as was
shown in the leading case on the declaration in Pennsylvania. 51 In Cryan's
Estate 152 plaintiff sought a declaration of interest taken in realty given
under a will, because she wished to borrow money to make repairs and to
meet a mortgage which was about to mature. Plaintiff, as executrix and
beneficiary, claimed either a fee or a joint fee with a sister but had never
taken possession of the property. The children of a deceased devisee claimed
a vested interest, because of which the plaintiff could not secure a loan.
Plaintiff did not wish to sue for partition, because none of the parties desired
to sell; there was no surplus to distribute, so she could not file an accounting;
and defendant not being in possession, she could not bring ejectment. The
declaration clarified the position. At various times it may become important
to fix the extent of the interest taken by the widow, either because of the
ambiguous terms of the gift,153 her own acts,15 4 or the happening of certain
In re Metropolitan Plan, 77 Pitts. 481 and 6o9 (Pa. 1929).
's People's Telephone Corp. v. City of Butler, 99 Pa. Super. 256 (193o).
" Cupp Grocery Co. v. Johnstown, sufra note 27 (plaintiff owner of 33 stores claims
liability to only one license tax of sioo as a corporation, not s9s5 as assessed).
SUpra p. 325 et seq. (discussion of cases in which it was held that there was no juris-
diction to grant declaratory judgment).
' Kariher's Petition, supra note 2.
Supra note 6.
' Dommell's Estate, supra note 29 (all property to be given to wife, who was instructed
to make certain gifts) ; Trout v. Knott, 16 D. & C. iii (Pa. 193o) (direction to executor to
make small payments to wife "to live on", remainder on her death to grandchildren) ; Sevock
Estate, IO Wash. 174 (Pa. 1926) (gift of all property to wife, her heirs and assigns, followed
by a wish that she divide all property with their children).
Shirk's Estate, io D. & C. 170 (Pa. 1927) (gift of all property for life or until re-
marriage, then as if there were no will, she had remarried) ; Lacey's Estate, 79 Pitts. 126
(Pa. 1930) (widow had elected to take under statute).
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events. 155 Likewise the determination of whether or not the rule in Shelley's
Case is applicable is occasionally vital.15 6 The difficulty may arise because
the gift was given to a group,1 57 because events may have forced a transfer
of interest,158 or because the gift was complicated in terms and facts.15°
The utility of the declaration is not confined to questions of interest in
realty but extends to those in personalty. 1 60  It serves also to crystallize the
rights and duties of the trustee and executor, when those fiduciaries are
confronted with disputes as to the administration of the estate,' 6 ' the validity
of the gift which the testator sought to give,16 2 points as to the form of the
will,1 3 or the rights of some third person, stranger to the estate, who has
acquired an interest in the property of the estate.' 6 4
In deciding all such issues, the court takes pains to see that all benefici-
aries are made parties. 1 5
Titles to Property
Questions concerning the title to property, real and personal, are con-
veniently settled by declaratory judgment and Pennsylvania offers a number
of interesting cases of this type. The issue may involve the interpretation
' Snavely's Estate, supra note 91 (widow, who had elected to take under statute, claimed
rights after death of one of the children) ; Brinker's Estate, 22 North. 79 (Pa. 1929) (wife
had predeceased).
"OWilcox's Estate, Ii D. & C. 781 (Pa. 1928); Keith v. Keith, 12 D. & C. 416 (Pa.
1929).
'Conner's Estate, 3o2 Pa. 534, 153 Atl. 730 (1931) (gift of all property to N, A, and
W, with directions that Ar take the homestead, maintain it, and divide the income; N was a
lunatic) ; Peters v. Peters, 307 Pa. 476, 162 AtI. 2o3 (1932) (gift under intestate laws to
heirs of V and H) ; It re Fletcher's Estate, 103 Pa. Super. 69, 157 AtI. 8io (1931) (gift to
CM and MF, "their children and blood relations forever"; MF had willed it to a daughter) ;
Estate of Martha Lichty, supra note 55 (gift of interest to L and A "during their natural
lives or survivor" ; Testatrix, L, and A had held as tenants in common).
B'Nai B'Rith Orphanage v. Roberts, supra note 29; In re Thompson's Estate, 304 Pa.
349, 155 Atl. 925 (i93i) ; Morris v. Morris, supra note 24; Hirst's Estate, supra note 37;
Senft's Petition, smpra note io; In the Estate of James Boyd, 28 Dauph. 153 (Pa. 1925).
m Smith's Petition,'mspra note 28; In re Lerch's Estate, 309 Pa. 23, 159 Atl. 868 (1932);
Cole's Estate, 15 D. & C. 655 (Pa. 193o) ; Schmeck's Estate, 23 Berks 277 (Pa. 1931).
IcIn re Simpson's Estate, 304 Pa. 396, 156 Atl. 91 (1931) (right of remaindermen to
share in sale proceeds when life tenant exercised his power to sell) ; In re Estate of Herbert
Cook, 2 Som. 5o8 (Pa. 1925) (widow's rights in 5-year timber contract).
'In Kidd's Estate, supra note 37 (power to sell; case arose after the widow's death and
turned on whether or not she had taken a fee) ; Kalbach's Estate, IO D. & C. 195 (Pa. 1927)
(duties in relation to trust for purchase and erection of tombstones) ; Koller's Estate, 12 D.
& C. 185 (Pa. 1928) (power to sell farm to widow) ; Hahn's Estate, 22 North. 134 (Pa.
1929) (right to pay over capital under terms of trust).
2 Brown's Estate, supra note 29 (validity of complicated gift under rule of perpetuities:
note form of declaration given) ; Brinker's Estate, supra note 155 (gift to charity).
"3 Sevock Estate, supra note 153 (effect of paragraph added after testator's signature
and that of the witnesses).
"' Everts v. Kepler, supra note 12 (validity of plaintiff's judgment against defendant's
interest received under a will) ; Johnson's Estate, supra note 36 (plaintiff grantee of FJ
asked declaration of interest received by FJ under his father's will, which gave him the farm
for life but provided that, if any child died without issue, the survivors took, but that, if there
was issue, issue took; at the time of conveyance there had been no challenge of title).
'- Moorhead Estate v. Nelson, supra note 64; cf. Paine's Estate, supra note 37; and dis-
cussion, supra p. 332 et seq.
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of a will, deed, or statute, out of which the title is derived, and the action
serves in many cases the same purpose as an equitable bill to quiet title.
Thus, a person in possession whose title has been challenged through a
defect in the chain may seek a declaration against his predecessors to estab-
lish what interest the one challenged took in the governing instrument, deed
or will, under which he claimed and conveyed.' 16 So, a purchaser or prospec-
tive purchaser at a sheriff's sale or from an executor may bring such a pro-
ceeding to clear the title. 16 7 A vendor of land whose vendee questioned his
title because of a restrictive covenant successfully brought an action to have
it declared that the covenant was personal to his predecessor in the title and
did not run with the land.'6 8 Complicated questions arising out of long-
term leasing of oil and gas rights have been determined between the heirs of
the owner of the fee and the lessees.' 9 Conflicting claims to the succession
in property through and against the will have been conveniently determined
by this method.170 The severability of interests as between surface owner
and lessee of oil rights has thus been determined, for the purpose of adjudi-
cating the separate liability to the payment of taxes.
17
Equally successful have been the attempts to decide the ownership of
personal property, which often requires the construction of deeds, contracts,
wills, assignments, trusts, and other instruments. The transfer of ownership
of a savings bank account by direction of the donor to the bank,'. 2 the
question whether a gift inter vivos of a bank account had been properly
effected by a decedent just before death, 7 3 the effect of a joint owner's
insanity on the right of the other owner to draw on the bank account, an
issue propounded by the bank as plaintiff," 4 the respective rights of common
and preferred stockholders in the distribution of the assets of a dissolved
corporation,. 75 the defendant's title to an automobile he sought to deliver to
the plaintiff 176 are among the questions of title to personal property which
have been adjudicated by declaration.
Conclusion
This survey of Pennsylvania declaratory judgments will have indicated
the wide range of usefulness of the Uniform Act and its proper limitations.
'1 Johnson's Estate, supra note 36.
'IT Ellis v. Commonwealth Trust Co., supra note 28 (defendant executor's implied power
to sell realty declared) ; Musser v. Grove, 15 D. & C. 628 (Pa. 193o) ; Moore v. Oyer, supra
note 35.
'c Barmach v. Barwick, supra note 93.
1 Havens v. Graybill, 14 D. & C. 401 (Pa. 193o).
'7' Long v. Uhl, supra note 48; Senft's Petition, supra note 10.
' Thornbury v. Forbes, supra note 1O7.
Reap, Ex'r v. Wyoming Valley Trust Co., supra note 23.
27 Patanyi v. First Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh, supra note 41.
17'1; re Northumberland Nat. Bank, 1i D. & C. 143 (Pa. 1927).
H E-ite v. Clark & Snover Co., supra note 65.
'¢ Swank Motor Sales Co. v. Decker, supra note 8.
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It will become apparent that the Pennsylvania courts, while giving the Act
appropriate application in many cases, have nevertheless on occasion fallen
into error in considering it in principle an exclusive or extraordinary remedy
and have thus failed to follow the statute. The doubts which this aberrant
policy must have spread among the lawyers and citizens of Pennsylvania
may well have often deterred litigants from invoking the statute. It may be
hoped that this unfortunate obstacle to the execution of the remedial pur-
poses of the statute will soon be removed and that the integrity of the Kariher
decision will be fully restored. In the light of the experience of Pennsylvania
and of the thirty-two other American jurisdictions now enjoying the benefits
of declaratory procedure, it may be hoped that Pennsylvania and other states
will give the Act the same broad scope extended to it in England and other
British jurisdictions.
